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Abstract
I estimate the eects of uncertainty about candidates' ideological positions and in-
stitutionally imposed costs of voting on the likelihood that an individual turns out
and votes. I do this using a simple model of turnout and vote choice that reects
the combined, simultaneous nature of vote decision-making. I show that eliminat-
ing the registration deadline and instituting DMV registration would have increased
turnout in the 1972-2000 Presidential elections by an average of 6.0 percentage points.
This eect is smaller than that of reducing uncertainty, which would have increased
turnout in the same elections by an average of 9.2 percentage points.
I show that these changes would have had quite dierent impacts on the outcome of
each election. The increased number of votes due to eliminating registration deadlines
would generally have advantaged Democratic candidates, even changing the outcome
of one of the eight elections (1984) in favor of the Democratic candidate. This is in
contradiction to the conclusion of Wolnger and Rosenstone (1980) who claim that
registration law reform would have no impact on election outcomes. In contrast,
I nd that the increased number of votes due to reducing uncertainty would have
advantaged candidates of both parties fairly equally over the course of the elections
studied. This suggests that it may be more politically feasible to increase turnout
with policies that aim to reduce uncertainty rather than with policies that aim to
reduce registration barriers.
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1Chapter 1 Introduction
In recent U.S. Presidential elections just over half of the electorate has turned out to
vote. As shown by Rosenstone and Hanson (1993), E.E. Schattschneider (1960), and
Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995), turnout and participation is markedly higher
among individuals with high amounts of resources such as education and income. For
this reason, low rates of turnout cause potentially grave problems for the democratic
process because the political preferences and demands revealed to elected oÆcials
through the election mechanism are biased toward those of citizens with elevated
social and economic status.
Moreover, politicians face clear incentives to enact policies that satisfy the needs
of that segment of the electorate that is most likely to ensure their reelection. As
voters are unlikely to be low income, low education or minority, politicians are thus
strategically motivated to focus their eorts on legislation that benets the most elite
and wealthy among U.S. citizens. In this way, not only do elected oÆcials not hear
the unvoiced political demands of those that do not participate in U.S. elections, they
also face few incentives to enact policies that benet non-voting groups of the U.S.
electorate.
This suggests that a worthwhile endeavor is to nd the determinants of turnout
and how it is inuenced by policies and institutions. A number of books and papers
(for example, Highton (1997), Katosh and Traugott (1981), Kim, Petrocik and Enok-
son (1975), Leighley and Nagler (1992), and Palfrey and Poole (1987)) have been
published in eorts to do this. Wolnger and Rosenstone's seminal book Who Votes?
(1980) is perhaps the most comprehensive such analysis. Wolnger and Rosenstone
show that turnout is strongly predicted by both individual and institutional factors
that eect the costs of voting incurred by the individual voter. Their results indicate
that institutions, particularly registration deadlines, play a critical role in turnout.
They conclude that eliminating registration deadlines would lead to an increase in
2turnout of 6.1 percentage points and eliminating this and a number of other state
requirements would increase turnout by 9.1 percentage points.
Rosenstone and Hanson (1993) shed further light on the causes of turnout. Like
Wolnger and Rosenstone they show that both resources and institutions inuence
the likelihood that an individual turns out to vote. Additionally, they demonstrate
that individuals' evaluations of political parties and of the candidates running for
oÆce aect the likelihood that they turnout. Their results show that individuals who
hold the parties and candidates in high regard are more likely to vote than those who
do not. This analysis is one of the rst systematic attempts to incorporate political
preferences into the study of turnout.
Yet these eorts suer from the fact that they are not based upon a well-dened
model of the individual's decision to vote. As shown by Dubin and Kalsow (1996) and
Lacy and Burden (1999), the decision to turnout is not one that is made independently
of the decision to vote for one or another candidate. Rather, turnout and candidate
choice are combined actions that result from a single decision-making process. As
such, divorcing the study of turnout from that of candidate choice may result in a
mis-specied model and incorrect results.
Perhaps it is because studies of turnout have mostly ignored vote choice that the
role of information in turnout has been largely overlooked. This is in spite of the
fact that studies of candidate choice have shown that uncertainty and information
about each of the candidates running for election strongly inuence voting behavior.
Alvarez (1997) and Bartels (1986) demonstrate that voters are much less likely to
vote for a candidate of whose ideological position they are uncertain. Franklin (1991)
discusses how election campaigns that stress candidate issues lead to increased clarity
among voters' perceptions of their candidates' ideologies.
Rosenstone and Wolnger (1980) show that political informedness is highly corre-
lated with education. Yet they do not include political information as an independent
variable in their model of turnout. Rather, they conclude from the correlation that
\education imparts information about politics" (p. 18), thus implying that its causal
relationship is so strong that it may proxy for it as a predictive variable. However,
3Alvarez (1997), Alvarez and Franklin (1994, 2002), and Franklin (1991) have shown
that political uncertainty is caused by a number of factors including media exposure
and candidate strategy as well as education. Hence, it may be expected to play a role
in turnout that is distinct from that of education.
Palfrey and Poole (1987) and Sanders (2001) are among the few published studies
of information and turnout. Palfrey and Poole (1987) model the vote decision in a
nested fashion such that the decision to turnout is binary and vote choice is con-
ditional upon turnout. They also measure information as a single composite index,
hence, they show that political information is correlated with turnout, without eval-
uating the eect of candidate-specic information on either turnout or vote choice.
Sanders (2001) assumes that the inuence of uncertainty on turnout is dependent
on preferences: as individuals' uncertainty increases, those who strongly prefer one
candidate to the other are more likely to abstain whereas those who have weak pref-
erences or are indierent are more likely to turnout. Although it is supported by his
empirical test, there is no intuitive nor rational justication given for this model of
the vote decision.
1
The goal of the analysis presented in this study is to evaluate the eects of both
political information (or uncertainty) and institutions on turnout and vote choice.
This is done using a simple, standard model of voting behavior that recognizes the
simultaneous nature of the decision between abstention, voting for one candidate or
voting for the other candidate. The elections analyzed are U.S. Presidential elections
between 1972 and 2000. As Table 1.1 shows, turnout for each of these elections was
roughly 50% of the voting-age population.
2
The empirical results described later
in this study show that uncertainty causes aggregate turnout in U.S. Presidential
elections to decline substantially. Between 1972 and 2000 it reduced the rate of
turnout by an average of 9.2 percentage points in Presidential elections. Institutional
registration requirements had a less powerful impact over the same years { decreasing
1
This model is analyzed in Wilson (2001) where it is shown to be less accurate than the model
of the vote decision used in this study.
2
FEC statistics slightly under estimate turnout as they are based upon the voting-age population
rather than the eligible electorate.
4Table 1.1: Turnout in U.S. Presidential Elections 1972-2000
Percent of U.S. Voting-Age Population*
Year Turnout
1972 55.2%
1976 53.6%
1980 52.6%
1984 53.1%
1988 50.1%
1992 55.1%
1996 49.1%
2000 51.3%
* Source: Federal Election Commission Web page.
turnout by an average of 6.0 percentage points in Presidential elections.
Importantly, reducing these two barriers to turnout would have had quite dierent
eects on the election outcome. The increased number of votes due to minimizing
uncertainty would have advantaged the candidates of both major parties as well as
third parties over the course of the eight elections studied. Likewise, it would have
varied across elections in whether or not it advantaged the incumbent or the major
party challenger.
Conversely, registration law reform would generally have advantaged the Demo-
cratic candidate. In seven of the eight elections analyzed it would have increased the
expected percentage of the electorate turning out to vote for the Democrat by more
than the change for the Republican. Moreover, in one election it would have been
expected to change the outcome of the election in favor of the Democratic candidate.
This contradicts the results of Wolnger and Rosenstone (1980), who concluded that
changing the registration deadline would not change election outcomes. Thus, these
results demonstrate the importance of modeling turnout and vote choice together, as
well as that turnout may be increased through two factors: political information and
the length before the election of the registration deadline.
The organization of the rest of this study is as follows. The model of turnout and
vote choice is discussed in detail in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, I describe the oper-
ationalization of uncertainty and the data measuring these variables along with the
statistical methods I employ. The results of the empirical estimation and simulated
5changes in turnout and vote choice are detailed in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 contains
a slightly dierent analysis that examines the impact of changes in uncertainty and
institutional deterrents to turnout on the composition of the voting population. Fi-
nally, Chapter 6 contains a concluding discussion of both the model and the empirical
results presented in this study.
6Chapter 2 The Vote Decision
The model of the vote decision that is proposed in this study is unlike those used in
previous research on turnout because it is not a simple binary-action model. Past
studies of turnout (among them Highton (1997), Leighley and Nagler (1992), Rosen-
stone and Hanson (1993), and Wolnger and Rosenstone (1980)) have assumed that
the choice faced by the eligible voter on election day is between turnout and absten-
tion. This assumption is problematic in that it fails to account for the fact that the
decision to turnout is inextricably linked to the choice between candidates running
for oÆce.
The binary turnout decision model implies that candidate choice is nested after the
turnout choice on the decision tree. Such a decision-making process would involve a
tie-breaking mechanism (such as ipping a coin) when voters are indierent between
the candidates running for oÆce. Yet, as individuals facing the vote decision, we
know that this is not how our choice is made. Rather, when we decide to turnout it is
because we are going to turnout and vote for a particular candidate. Evidence of this
is demonstrated by the results of Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes (1964) who
show that less than 0.2% of voters make their candidate selection on election day.
Thus, the model of the vote decision that is the basis for the analysis in this paper
is one that combines the individual's choice of which candidate to support with her
choice of whether to turnout or abstain.
1
The reason for this is simple: these are not
decisions that are made sequentially, but rather a single decision made among a set
of choices (to vote for one candidate, to vote for another candidate, or to abstain)
that are evaluated simultaneously. Empirical evidence for this is provided by Lacy
and Burden (1999), who show that the decision to abstain depends upon the utility
an individual earns from voting for each of the candidates running for oÆce.
1
For simplicity I use the male pronoun to refer to candidates and the female pronoun to refer to
voters.
7This model is a simple extension of the traditional spatial model of sincere voting
that was rst discussed in the seminal work \Stability in Competition" by Hotelling
(1929). While this paper is most famous among economists who specialize in Indus-
trial Organization, its impact spread across disciplines to include political scientists
studying voting behavior. According to Hotelling, a choice set (whether it be con-
sumer goods or candidates) could be accurately modeled as arrayed across a single
dimensional line along with consumer (or individual) ideal point locations. Individ-
uals would prefer those goods or candidates located close to their ideal points over
those located far away. In his discussion of this formal structure, Hotelling foretold
Black's famous Median Voter Theorem (1958):
The competition for votes between the Republican and Democratic
parties does not lead to a clear drawing of issues, an adoption of two
strongly contrasted positions between which the voter may choose. In-
stead, each party strives to make its platform as much like the others as
possible. Any radical departure would lose many votes, even though it
might lead to stronger commendation of the party by some who would
vote for it anyhow. (p. 1928)
Later work by Palfrey (1984) and Callander (2000) have shown that realistic
extensions to the formal game of candidate competition including third-party entry
and party competition over multiple districts produce equilibria with the separate,
non-centrist candidate platform locations that we observe in most U.S. elections.
Smithies (1941) extended Hotelling's model of individual decision-making to include
costs, thereby demonstrating why individuals might choose to abstain rather than
vote for a candidate. Accordingly, the individual i's expected utility for voting for a
candidate j may be represented as
E(U
ij
) = E(Æ
j
p
ij
  
j
c
i
): (2.1)
8The variables Æ and  in this model represent (strictly positive) decision weights.
The rst term p
ij
represents the proximity of the candidate's platform to the indi-
vidual's ideal point. The second term c
i
represents the total costs of voting that
are incurred by the individual. These costs of voting include the costs of becoming
informed about the candidates, how (or where) to register and cast a ballot, and the
lost income of the time taken to do so.
In this model, voting is assumed to be a consumptive act. This is consistent with
(although may not necessarily be interpreted as) the notion of voting as expressive
behavior that benets individuals by allowing them to demonstrate personal political
beliefs and convictions. Expressive models of voting and their relationship to other
models are detailed in Shuessler (2000) and Green and Shapiro (1994). This theory
of voting implies that there is no purposive benet of abstention. By abstaining, an
individual neither incurs the cost nor receives the benet of voting for a candidate.
For this reason, her utility from abstention is equal to zero.
U
i;
= 0: (2.2)
Since the formalization of this model, (often referred to as the \spatial" or \prox-
imity" model), by Smithies (1941), it has been a mainstay in the political science
literature. However, its application has generally been to empirical studies of vote
choice rather than turnout. Examples of research where it has been used (with vary-
ing degrees of formality) include Abramowitz (1984), Alvarez (1997), Alvarez and
Nagler (1995), Kelley and Mirer (1974), Lacy and Burden (1999), Page and Jones
(1979), and Schoeld, Martin, Quinn and Whitford (1998).
The reason for the widespread use of this model in political science is fairly clear:
it is more accurate than any other spatial model at explaining voting behavior. The
two most well-known rival models are the rational choice model (Riker and Ordeshook
(1968)) and the directional model (Rabinowitz and MacDonald (1989)). Merrill and
Grofman (1999) discuss a unied extension of the directional and proximity models.
The rational choice model is actually a fairly simple extension of the sincere voting
9model in which the modications are driven by the perception of the individual as
completely instrumental in evaluating her utility for voting for a candidate versus
her utility for abstaining. Nonetheless, while the rational choice model is remarkable
for its logical elegance and simplicity, it performs poorly when subjected to empirical
testing. A number of studies (Ferejohn and Fiorina (1975), Foster (1984), Whitely
(1995), and Alvarez, Ansolabehere and Wilson (2002)) have shown that the likelihood
that an individual turns out to vote is not signicantly increased by the closeness of
an election.
The directional model has, if anything, fared less well under empirical scrutiny
than the rational choice model. This model posits that an individual's utility for
voting for a candidate increases as both her ideal point and the candidate's platform
move toward the extreme end of the same side of the ideology scale. King and Lewis
(2000) show that empirical support for the directional model rests on the assump-
tions employed in the data analysis. Among these assumptions is the use of objective
candidate ideological placement. Using the mean yields support for the directional
model yet obliterates the pattern in survey response of individuals placing the can-
didates they prefer closer to their own ideal point and those that they do not prefer
farther from their own ideal point. Strikingly, the motivation for this survey response
pattern strongly corroborates the sincere rather than the directional model. Likewise,
Westholm (1997, 2002) and Lewis (2002) show that careful empirical analysis leads
to rejection of the directional model in favor of the sincere model.
Thus, while the sincere voting model remains the most accurate model to explain
voting behavior, it has not been applied to the study of turnout. Here, I employ a
form of the model that has been generalized in the manner rst discussed by Enelow
and Hinich (1984). Enelow and Hinich recognized that eligible voters have imperfect
information about candidates' ideological platforms. Instead of perceiving candidates'
platforms as isolated points on the ideology scale, citizens perceive them as distribu-
tions over likely points, each with an expected mean value and an associated variance.
It is this variance that represents the individual's uncertainty about the candidate's
ideology. The level of variance corresponds with the level of uncertainty in the in-
10
dividual's perception of the location of the candidate's platform. As described by
Enelow and Hinich, this uncertainty may be categorized according to three types of
causes: candidate-induced, perceptual, and predictive.
The research presented here is focused on perceptual rather than predictive or
candidate-induced uncertainty, as the former varies across individuals while the lat-
ter varies only across candidates. As described by Enelow and Hinich, perceptual
uncertainty is due to imperfect information because \information is costly to acquire,
and incentives for doing so are typically weak or nonexistent in mass elections" (p.
122). Individuals who incur high costs of becoming informed are therefore more likely
to be uncertain. Further, the conveyance of information about candidates to eligible
voters through the mass media is inherently imperfect.
The sincere voting model presented in Equation 2.1 above may be modied slightly
so as to incorporate individual uncertainty. Assuming the candidate's proximity to
the individual's ideology is measured by the negative quadratic distance between the
individual's ideological position s
i
and that of the candidate x
j
yields
E(U
ij
) = E( Æ
j
(s
i
  x
j
)
2
  
j
c
i
: (2.3)
Incorporating the assumption that the individual has imperfect information and
perceives the candidate's ideological position with error such that the expected loca-
tion is ex
j
and the error is 
ij
produces
E(U
ij
) = E( Æ
j
(s
i
  (ex
j
+ 
ij
))
2
  
j
c
i
: (2.4)
Working through the equation algebraically and assuming that the expected value
of the error term is zero yields the following sequence
11
E(U
ij
) = E( Æ
j
(s
i
  ex
j
  
ij
)
2
  
j
c
i
)
E(U
ij
) = E( Æ
j
(s
2
i
  2s
i
ex
j
  2s
i

ij
+ ex
2
j
+ 2ex
j

ij
+ 
2
ij
)  
j
c
i
)
U
ij
=  Æ
j
(s
2
i
  2s
i
ex
j
+ ex
2
j
+ 
2
ij
)  
j
c
i
:
Re-substituting ep
ij
for the ideological proximity of the candidate to the individual
and assuming Æ is made up of the two parameters  and  produces a simple function
representing the individual's utility for voting for the candidate
U
ij
= 
j
ep
ij
  
2
ij
  
j
c
i
: (2.5)
This species that the utility an individual earns from voting for a candidate is
increasing in that candidate's ideological proximity to the individual, decreasing in
the individual's uncertainty about the candidate's ideological position and decreasing
in the cost she incurs to vote.
2
To evaluate the potential magnitude of the impact of uncertainty on voting behav-
ior I translate the utility function shown above in Equation 2.5 into one that describes
probabilistic behavior. To do this, I incorporate into the model above a term 
ij
that
represents the unmeasured components of an individual's utility for voting for candi-
date j. I assume that 
ij
is distributed extreme-value and is independent of the other
predictive variables in the model.
U
ij
+ 
ij
= 
j
ep
ij
  
2
ij
  
j
c
i
+ 
ij
: (2.6)
An individual is expected to vote for candidate j if her utility for voting for j is
2
Note that in Equation 2.5 the parameter  is constant for all U
ij
. This leads me to estimate a
conditional multinomial logit, discussed in more detail in Section 3.2.
12
greater than that for abstention or for voting for another candidate j
0
. This can be
written
U
ij
+ 
ij
> U
ij0
+ 
ij0
U
ij
+ 
ij
> 0:
Probabilistically, this implies
Pr(V ote
ij
) =
exp (U
ij
)
1 + exp (U
ij
) + exp (U
ij0
)
: (2.7)
Figures 2.1{2.2 show graphically the relationship between uncertainty and the
vote decision. These gures are produced by inserting hypothetical values into the
terms shown in Equation 2.6 above.
Figure 2.1 shows the inuence of uncertainty about a candidate's ideology on the
probabilities that an individual votes for that candidate or for the opposing candidate.
The x-axis measures the individual's uncertainty about the candidate (increasing from
left to right) and the y-axis measures the probability that the individual makes a given
vote decision. As the solid line shows, the individual is less likely to turnout and vote
for a candidate the more uncertain she is about that candidate's ideology. Conversely,
she becomes more likely to turnout and vote for the opposing candidate (indicated by
the broken line), as this makes the size of the utility of voting for that candidate large
by comparison. Likewise, the individual becomes more likely to abstain, as shown by
the dotted line, because the relative utility of abstention increases.
Figure 2.2 shows the inuence of uncertainty about a candidate's ideology on
turnout, broken down by three dierent levels of costs of voting. The axes are essen-
tially the same as in Figure 2.1, although the y-axis in this case may be specically
interpreted as the probability of turnout. Not surprisingly, the general trend shown
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Figure 2.1: The Eects of Uncertainty on the Vote Decision
in Figure 2.2 is that uncertainty about a candidate reduces the likelihood that an
individual turns out to vote. In addition, the gure shows that high costs of voting
cause uncertainty to decrease the likelihood of turnout by more than for low costs of
voting. This is because costs of voting impact the utility for each candidate individ-
ually, whereas uncertainty about a given candidate impacts only the utility for that
candidate.
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Figure 2.2: The Eects of Uncertainty on Turnout by Costs of Voting
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The model of the vote decision formalized in Equation 2.5 may be used to de-
rive hypotheses about voting behavior. The following three hypotheses (supported
formally in the appendix) result from this model:
Hypothesis 1: Turnout increases as the electorate's uncertainty about one or all
candidates decreases.
An individual who is more certain about a single candidate's ideological position
is weakly more likely to turnout and an individual who is more certain about all
candidates' ideological positions is strictly more likely to turnout than an identical
individual who is less certain. This is because the utility for voting for a candidate
is decreasing in uncertainty about the candidate. Decreasing uncertainty across the
electorate (who are expected to have a broad range of dierences in utility for the
candidates) will thus increase turnout.
Hypothesis 2: The vote share of a candidate increases as the electorate's uncertainty
about a candidate decreases.
The intuition behind this hypothesis is similar to that behind Hypothesis 1. Re-
ducing uncertainty about a candidate increases individuals' utility for voting for that
candidate. Across the electorate this will cause many individuals to vote for that
candidate when they otherwise would have abstained or voted for the opposing can-
didate.
Taken together, Hypotheses 1 and 2 have very clear implications for candidate
campaign strategy. The most obvious eect is that candidates will seek to minimize
uncertainty about their own ideological positions so as to increase turnout among
their own supporters. In addition, candidates will seek to increase uncertainty about
competitors so as to decrease turnout among competitors' supporters as well as switch
the preference of voters from the competitor to the given candidate. An example of
the latter strategy occurred in the 2002 California Republican Gubernatorial primary
campaign when Democratic Governor Gray Davis paid for television advertisements
that detailed Republican candidate Richard Riordan's changing stance on abortion
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rights. A strong candidate before the ads were aired, Riordan's vote share declined
and he subsequently lost the election by a wide margin (Finnegan (2002)).
Hypothesis 3: Turnout increases as the costs (including those that are institutionally
imposed) of voting incurred by the electorate decrease.
Lowering the costs of voting increases individuals' utility for voting for all candi-
dates. Across an electorate with a wide range of utilities for voting for each candidate,
lowering costs of voting will cause many individuals to turnout and vote when pre-
viously it would have been too costly for them to do so. For this reason, we should
expect to see turnout increase when both institutional and individual costs of voting
are reduced.
In Chapter 4 I describe how these hypotheses stand up to empirical analysis.
In the next chapter, I begin my discussion of this empirical analysis by describing
the details of its construction. This includes the source of the data I use, how the
formal variables are empirically measured and coded as well as the assumptions and
properties of the statistical model that is employed.
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Chapter 3 Analysis of the Vote Decision
I test the accuracy of the model just described using data from the past eight Presi-
dential elections (1972{2000). The primary reason that I use data from all eight elec-
tions rather than merely one or two is that taken together they provide an extremely
robust analysis of the vote decision. The variety in the context and the features of
the elections is tremendous: three of the elections had strong third-party candidates
(1980, 1992, and 1996), two of the elections had no incumbent (1988, 2000), one had
an incumbent who was not previously elected to the oÆce (1976), three had gover-
nors as challengers (1976, 1988, 1992), three had senators as challengers (1972, 1984,
1996), one had a congressman as a challenger (1980) and two had (the same) high
prole businessman (1992, 1996) as a challenger. Furthermore, using these elections
allows me to compare my results with those of other studies of turnout in the same
elections such as DeNardo (1980), Nagler (1991), Rosenstone and Hanson (1993), and
Rosenstone and Wolnger (1980).
The data I use for this analysis is the National Election Studies (NES) collection
merged with variables measuring state-level registration requirements. The NES data
is based on an individual-level survey that has been administered to a national sample
of eligible voters during every midterm and Presidential election since 1948. The NES
survey includes a variety of questions about respondents' demographic traits, political
preferences and ideology, their placements of the major candidates for President on
the ideology scale, their interest in the national news and their attention to media
coverage of various aspects of the election campaign. Most importantly, the NES
questionnaire asks respondents if they voted in the Presidential election and (if so)
for which candidate they cast their vote.
It is this question that sets the NES collection apart from the Current Popu-
lation Survey (CPS) data, which is the basis for most studies of turnout (Alvarez,
Ansolabehere and Wilson (2002), Highton (1997), Leighley and Nagler (1992), and
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Wolnger and Rosenstone (1980)). The advantages of the CPS collection are twofold.
First is its sheer size; collected every year since 1964 by the Census Bureau, the voter
supplement generally contains approximately 100,000 observations. This allows re-
searchers to produce very stable, consistent results. Second is its reported rate of
turnout, which is somewhat higher than the estimates of turnout released by the
FEC and shown in Table 1.1 but quite a bit lower than the reported rate of turnout
in NES data.
Katz (2000) proposes an elegant method for correcting for over-report when using
a binary probit model. This method relies on voter validated NES data, the most
recent collection of which occurred in 1988. However, validating survey respondent
voting proved prohibitively diÆcult for the NES due to the sizable ratio of respondents
whose voting records either couldn't be checked (from 1964{1988 this ranged between
1.7% and 15.8%) or even if they could be checked, could not be found (from 1964{
1988 this ranged from 5.8% to 15.6%).
1
In addition, Katosh and Traugott (1981)
and Sigelman (1982) provide evidence that using voter validated data rather than
reported data has no strong eect on predictions about voting.
The most likely cause of the dierence between the NES and CPS reported rates of
turnout is the fact that CPS data, unlike NES data, does not consist of a pre-election
wave containing questions about the upcoming election. A number of studies in-
cluding Clausen (1968), Kraut and McConahay (1973), and Yalch (1976) have shown
that these questions increase respondent's awareness of the election, prompting many
to turnout when previously they would not have done so. In fact, the impact of the
pre-election wave may be quite dramatic, as controlled studies by Kraut and McCona-
hay (1973) have found an increase in the actual rate of turnout by 29{31 percentage
points. In fact, given the inaccuracies of survey vote validating, it is possible that
most of the increase in the turnout rate as measured by the NES rather than the
FEC is due to the eects of the pre-election survey.
Yet the NES survey contains important information that is not found in the CPS
survey. Because it is conducted by the government, the CPS survey does not ask
1
These statistics are available in Traugott (1989).
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questions about political ideology, partisan attachment or vote choice. Hence, studies
that are based on this data can only explain turnout as a product of individual and
contextual costs. They must ignore the eects of political preferences as well as the
fundamental role of vote choice.
It is for this reason that I analyze the individual-level NES data merged with
state-level registration data. The state-level data is taken from two sources: for the
years 1972{1992 it comes from an ICPSR collection of those years by Mitchell and
Wlezien and for the years 1996{2000 it comes from the appropriate editions of \The
Book of the States" published by the Council of State Governments.
2
Both of these
sources apply rigorous and consistent data collection techniques, drawing on state
statutes and information made available by Secretaries of State. Together, the NES
data and the institutional data provide an ideal forum for analyzing the relationship
between information, institutions and the vote decision.
3.1 Operationalization of the Formal Model
In this section I describe how the variables that compose the formal model are mea-
sured for the empirical analysis. The dependent variable is a limited variable that
denotes whether or not the respondent abstains, votes for one candidate or votes for
another candidate in each of the eight Presidential data collections. I code the vote
choice for all candidates that earn a minimum of 5% of the total vote share in each
election. I do this for two reasons. Firstly, it is diÆcult to obtain consistent esti-
mates for models run with candidates who earn less than 5% of the vote share. There
simply are not enough observations that relate to such candidates to be condent
in most statistical packages' ability to estimate the relevant coeÆcients. Secondly,
the federal government matches the campaign funds of all candidates that exceed the
5% vote share threshold. Hence, it is a level of candidate viability that is nationally
recognized. Table 3.1 shows the voteshares earned by those candidates in the eight
elections I study that surpass this threshold.
2
ICPSR 01102.
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Table 3.1: Vote Shares of Major U.S. Presidential Candidates 1972{2000
Percent of the U.S. Popular Vote*
Year Democrat Republican Other
1972 37.5% 60.7%
1976 50.1% 48.0%
1980 41.0% 50.7% 8.2%
1984 40.6% 58.8%
1988 45.6% 53.4%
1992 43.0% 37.4% 18.9%
1996 49.2% 40.7% 8.4%
2000 48.4% 47.9%
* Vote share shown for all candidates
winning at least 5% of the total.
Source: Scammon, McGillivray
and Cook (2001)
In the rest of this section, I describe how the independent variables that make up
the right-hand side of the formal model (candidate proximity, uncertainty and the
costs of voting) are operationalized for the empirical analysis. A benecial aspect
of the NES data is the consistency of the questions that make up the survey across
election years. Nonetheless, there is some variation and in the following discussion
I will cover dierences by year in both the existence of specic variables and the
manner in which they are coded.
3.1.1 Uncertainty about the Candidate
An eligible voter's uncertainty about the ideological platforms of candidates running
for oÆce is an intrinsically diÆcult thing to measure. The most obvious and perhaps
best way of doing this is simply to ask the individual directly. Since 1994 the NES
has done this in their survey, asking respondents immediately after each candidate
ideology placement question, \How certain are you of [name's] position on this scale?"
Respondents are then allowed one of three possible answers: \very certain," \pretty
certain," and \not very certain."
Alvarez and Franklin (separately and jointly) address the validity of this mea-
sure with a series of studies (Alvarez (1996, 1997) and Alvarez and Franklin (1994,
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2002)). These studies put to rest obvious fears regarding the comparability of di-
rectly measured uncertainty across survey respondents. Such fears are based upon
the suspicion that the response to the NES question is driven by a sense of uncertainty
that is unique to the individual. As Alvarez and Franklin show, the NES variable
corresponds well with the theoretical structure of uncertainty.
The direct measure of uncertainty is both strongly correlated with the individ-
ual's costs of voting and consistent with the individual's theorized perception of the
candidate's ideological position. According to this theory, while certain individu-
als generally perceive the candidates' ideological location with a probability density
function (pdf) that covers a short interval, has a narrow variance and an o-center
expected mean, uncertain individuals generally perceive the candidates' ideological
location with a pdf that covers the entire ideology scale and has an expected mean
at the scale midpoint.
3
Alvarez and Franklin demonstrate that NES respondents are
more likely to place a candidate at the ideological midpoint the more uncertain they
are about the candidate's ideological position, hence supporting the validity of the
direct measure of uncertainty.
Before 1994 the NES survey did not include any sort of direct measure of un-
certainty. For this reason, it is necessary to use a dierent operationalization of
uncertainty about the six Presidential elections between 1972 and 1992. There are
two established ways of doing this: one proposed by Bartels (1986) (hereafter referred
to as the \Bartels measure") and one proposed by Alvarez (1997) (hereafter referred
to as the \Alvarez measure"). In the following discussion I will evaluate both of these
measures along with a third measure that is a slightly modied version of the Alvarez
measure.
The Bartels measure is based upon the assumption that survey respondents \place
a candidate on an issue if they are suÆciently certain of the candidate's position on
that issue, but . . . refuse to place the candidate if their uncertainty exceeds some
threshold value" (Bartels, p. 713). Accordingly, the level of uncertainty about a given
3
The mean is expected to be located on the left half of the scale for liberal candidates and the
right half of the scale for conservative candidates.
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candidate may be estimated from the parameters of a model that predicts the prob-
ability of candidate placement using variables that measure the costs of information
to the individual. Individuals with higher costs of information are expected to have
greater levels of predicted uncertainty. As shown by the analysis of Bartels (1986),
this is soundly supported.
The assumptions behind the Bartels measure are compatible with the theory of
uncertainty and candidate placement discussed by Alvarez and Franklin (1994, 2002)
as well as with the standard Bayesian economic understanding of information and
learning (discussed by Achen (1992)). The individual's prior beliefs about candidates'
political ideology are assumed to be distributed normally across the real (unbounded)
line. Candidates send out signals about their ideological positions so as to inform vot-
ers about themselves. Whether due to candidate strategy or to imperfect information
transmission, these signals take the form of a distribution of location points with the
candidates' true position at the mean and the aggregate uncertainty across the elec-
torate indicated by the variance. Because the prior beliefs of individuals are based
essentially upon no candidate-specic information, individuals are assumed to update
their perceptions of the candidates' positions by heavily weighting the information
signals they receive during the campaign.
Well-informed individuals receive more of the signals about candidates' locations
than less informed individuals. For this reason, their perception of a candidate's ideo-
logical position is more likely to have a mean position at the candidate's true position
with a more narrowly distributed pdf around that point. Across the electorate, indi-
viduals with weak information (meaning that they received a low number of signals
from the candidate) are expected to place the candidate relatively far from the mean,
in the tails of the distribution of signals transmitted about his location. Conversely,
individuals with strong information (meaning they received a high number of signals
from the candidate) are expected to place the candidate at or close to the mean of
the distribution of signals transmitted about his location. Importantly, individuals
with no information (meaning they received no signals from the candidate) perceive
the candidate with the prior pdf and hence are very uncertain and likely to place the
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candidate at the midpoint of the prior distribution.
This denes two basic types of eligible voters. One type has some degree of infor-
mation that varies across individuals, and candidate placements by that type should
(in the aggregate) look like the distribution of signals sent about the candidate's po-
litical ideology with a greater frequency of placement at the mean than in the tails.
The other type has no information, and candidate placements by that type should
generally be at the mean of the prior pdf. This theory is essentially that described
and empirically supported by Alvarez and Franklin (1994, 2002), who show that indi-
viduals scale their perception of candidate ideology on to the bounded scales designed
for survey use.
However, Alvarez and Franklin do not address respondents' motivations for not
placing the candidates on survey-dened ideology scales. Clearly, this is an important
aspect of the relationship between information and candidate perception as an average
of 10%{15% of all NES respondents refuse to place one or all Presidential candidates
on the 7-point ideology scale. As shown by Bartels (1986), respondents do not place
the candidates because they are generally too uncertain to do so. Yet, as shown by
the pattern of survey responses catalogued by Alvarez and Franklin (1994, 2002), it
is clear that some respondents who do not receive information signals (and so should
be maximally uncertain) place the candidates on the ideology scale (at the scale
midpoint, with a small variance). It is fairly natural to assume that the factor that
distinguishes those uncertain individuals who place the candidates from those who do
not is a slightly heterogeneous level of dis-utility for being wrong. Those with greater
dis-utility as well as greater uncertainty are less likely to place the candidates on the
ideology scale than otherwise.
The Alvarez measure is based upon where the respondent places the candidate
rather than whether or not the respondent places the candidate. Specically, it is
the distance squared between the respondent's placement of the candidate and the
survey mean placement of the candidate. There are two fundamental assumptions
upon which this rests: that the mean placement of the candidate is the true location of
the candidate, and that the respondent's perceived uncertainty about the candidate's
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location is a function of the distance that she places the candidate from his true
location. In fact, the theory of information, learning and candidate placement that
is described above and that is consistent with the studies of Alvarez and Franklin
(1994, 2002) indicate that the mean candidate placement is not the true candidate
placement. As an unknown percentage of survey respondents have an uninformed
perception of the candidate's ideological position, the survey mean is to some degree
biased toward the prior expected belief.
Furthermore, while this measure is an accurate measure of the dierence in the
individual respondent's information from the mean respondent's information, it does
not necessarily follow that it is a precise measure of the individual respondent's per-
ceived uncertainty. Respondents that place the candidate far across the ideology scale
from the mean placement may have received political information that makes them
very certain about the candidate's location { even as their perception of that location
varies greatly from that of the rest of the electorate. It is their perceived uncertainty,
not the objective quality of their information, that enters into their decision calculus.
Nonetheless, as Alvarez (1997) shows, this is a reliable measure of uncertainty since
the aggregate link between uncertainty and political information remains.
The last measure of uncertainty that I shall consider is designated the \Wilson
measure." It involves a simple alteration of the Alvarez measure in which the true
location of the candidate is taken to be his mean placement by respondents who both
fall into the most highly educated 30% of the population and report regularly following
current events in the news.
4
The goal of this modication is to base the measure
on a more accurate estimate of the candidate's location. Using the most highly
informed respondents' placements is a rough means of nding the mean placement
among only informed survey respondents. However, not only is it unknown how
precisely this weeds out uniformed placements, it is also possible that due to political
preferences this leads to biased estimates of candidate location. Nonetheless, proof
of the validity of this measure is shown by how the mean placement of the highly
4
The measurement of this varies slightly with the question used by the NES. For 1984-2000 it is
reading a newspaper 5-7 times per week, for 1976-1980 it is reading a newspaper on a daily basis,
and for 1972 it is whether or not the respondent read about the campaign in the newspaper.
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educated respondents corresponds with the expected relationship of placement and
uncertainty outlined above; for the Democratic and Republican candidates it is further
from the midpoint of the scale than the mean placement of the entire survey sample.
Table 3.2: Correlation of Uncertainty Measures for 1996 Presidential Candidates
Full Sample Correlation CoeÆcients
Alvarez Wilson Bartels Direct
Bill Clinton
Alvarez 1.00
Wilson 0.98** 1.00
Bartels 0.37** 0.41** 1.00
Direct 0.13** 0.20** 0.22** 1.00
Bob Dole
Alvarez 1.00
Wilson 0.99** 1.00
Bartels 0.40** 0.41** 1.00
Direct 0.33** 0.37** 0.33** 1.00
Ross Perot
Alvarez 1.00
Wilson 0.97** 1.00
Bartels 0.24** 0.26** 1.00
Direct 0.20** 0.26** 0.16** 1.00
* indicates a =.10 level of statistical
signicance, two-tailed test.
** indicates a =.05 level of statistical
signicance, two-tailed test.
The simplest way to evaluate the measures of uncertainty is to check how well
they correlate with one another and the direct measure of uncertainty. Accordingly,
Tables 3.2{3.3 show the correlation coeÆcients of the uncertainty measures for each of
the major candidates in the 1996 and 2000 elections (these years are selected because
before 1994 the NES survey did not contain the direct question about respondent
uncertainty).
Of the three alternative measures, the Bartels measure is the most highly corre-
lated with the direct measure of uncertainty for two of the ve 1996 and 2000 Presi-
dential candidates, George W. Bush and Bill Clinton. Likewise, the Wilson measure
is the most highly correlated with the direct measure for another two of the ve 1996
and 2000 Presidential candidates, Robert Dole and Ross Perot. Surprisingly, the two
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Table 3.3: Correlation of Uncertainty Measures for 2000 Presidential Candidates
Full Sample Correlation CoeÆcients
Alvarez Wilson Bartels Direct
Al Gore
Alvarez 1.00
Wilson 0.98** 1.00
Bartels 0.27** 0.32** 1.00
Direct 0.26** 0.32** 0.32** 1.00
George W. Bush
Alvarez 1.00
Wilson 0.99** 1.00
Bartels 0.38** 0.39** 1.00
Direct 0.35** 0.37** 0.39** 1.00
* indicates a =.10 level of statistical
signicance, two-tailed test.
** indicates a =.05 level of statistical
signicance, two-tailed test.
measures are equally well correlated with the direct measure for the fth of the 1996
and 2000 Presidential candidates, Al Gore.
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Table 3.4: Correlation of Uncertainty Measures for 1996 Presidential Candidates
Partial Sample Correlation CoeÆcients
Alvarez Wilson Bartels Direct
Bill Clinton
Alvarez 1.00
Wilson 0.95** 1.00
Bartels 0.18** 0.24** 1.00
Direct -0.16** -0.05** 0.10** 1.00
Bob Dole
Alvarez 1.00
Wilson 0.98** 1.00
Bartels 0.27** 0.29** 1.00
Direct 0.07** 0.14** 0.25** 1.00
Ross Perot
Alvarez 1.00
Wilson 0.92** 1.00
Bartels 0.03** 0.04** 1.00
Direct -0.23** -0.16** 0.05 1.00
* indicates a =.10 level of statistical
signicance, two-tailed test.
** indicates a =.05 level of statistical
signicance, two-tailed test.
* This is the subsample of respondents that
place the candidates on the ideology scale.
Table 3.5: Correlation of Uncertainty Measures for 2000 Presidential Candidates
Partial Sample Correlation CoeÆcients
Alvarez Wilson Bartels Direct
Al Gore
Alvarez 1.00
Wilson 0.95** 1.00
Bartels 0.03 0.11** 1.00
Direct -0.13** -0.01 0.23** 1.00
George W. Bush
Alvarez 1.00
Wilson 0.98** 1.00
Bartels 0.23** 0.24** 1.00
Direct 0.04 0.09** 0.29** 1.00
* indicates a =.10 level of statistical
signicance, two-tailed test.
** indicates a =.05 level of statistical.
signicance, two-tailed test.
* This is the subsample of respondents that
place the candidates on the ideology scale.
28
This indicates that the measures perform similarly in comparison with the direct
measure. To verify that this true across survey respondents, I limit the correlations
shown in Tables 3.2{3.3 to include only those respondents that place the candidates
on the ideology scale. The correlation coeÆcients from this exercise are shown in
Tables 3.4{3.5. Although the correlation of each measure with the direct measure
drops substantially, the Bartels measure continues to perform fairly well. These re-
sults indicate that the Wilson measure relies heavily upon respondent non-placement
to predict respondent uncertainty.
The poor performance of the Alvarez measure may be attributed to the fact that
it was designed to be constructed from multiple issue dimensions (for a discussion of
this see Alvarez (1997)) rather than the single ideology scale used here. Hence, the
measure included in this analysis does not contain as much information as it would
if constructed in a multiple dimensional framework. Obviously, this makes it less
reliable in the present context.
The weakness of the Wilson measure in Tables 3.4{3.5 indicates that its estimation
most likely suers from an identication problem. This would arise from an inability
to distinguish informed respondents from uninformed respondents who place the can-
didate on the ideology scale (in spite of being uninformed), due to a low dis-utility
of being wrong. Obviously, a measure of uncertainty that takes advantage of the
information contained in both the placement of the candidate on the ideology scale
and the location of the placement of the candidate on the ideology scale is likely to be
a superior measure. Unfortunately, it appears from the results in Tables 3.2{3.5 that
such a measure is not yet available for the single dimensional data employed here.
Hence, I use the Bartels measure of uncertainty, which performs well consistently, in
the analysis that follows.
3.1.2 Ideological Proximity of the Candidate
The rst variable in the utility function shown in Equation 2.5 is the ideological
proximity of the candidate to the eligible voter. The most obvious operationalization
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of this variable is probably the negative quadratic distance between the candidate's
placement and the individual's self-placement on the 7-point NES ideology scale.
Obviously, this relies critically upon the individual's self-placement and the candi-
date's location on the NES 7-point ideology scale. Yet as discussed previously, the
mean candidate placement is most likely not the true location due to bias toward the
scale midpoint. Moreover, individuals who do not place themselves on the ideology
scale are dropped from the analysis, thereby inducing selection bias in the data and
estimation results.
As shown by Bartels (1986), individuals who are less certain about a candidate's
ideology are less likely to place the candidate on the 7-point ideology scale. This logic
extends to the individual's self-placement as individuals who are more uncertain about
their own location on the scale are more likely not to place themselves. Moreover,
because political information is a determining factor of uncertainty about one's own
ideology just as it is a determining factor of uncertainty about a candidate's platform,
these variables are likely to be correlated.
That this is true is shown by the following three tables. Tables 3.6{3.7 show
respondents' reported uncertainty about the major candidates running for election
in the years 1996 and 2000. The right half of each table shows the uncertainty of
the subsample that would be dropped from the analysis if it included the negative
quadratic dierence between the candidates' and respondents' ideological locations.
The left half of each table shows the uncertainty of the full sample. For each candidate,
individuals who do not place themselves on the ideology scale are less likely to report
being \very certain" or \pretty certain" than those who do place themselves on the
ideology scale. Furthermore, the abstention rate diers dramatically between the
subsample and the full sample. In 1996 the rate of abstention was 44.4% for the
subsample and 24.9% for the full sample, and likewise in 2000 the rate of abstention
was 44.4% for the subsample and 25.7% for the full sample.
Table 3.8 shows a more condensed version of the same pattern in Tables 3.6{3.7
using the Bartels measure of uncertainty for every major candidate in all Presidential
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Table 3.6: Sample and Subsample: Respondent Uncertainty (Directly Measured)
1996 Presidential Candidate Ideological Positions
Full Sample Subsample*
Candidate Clinton Perot Dole Clinton Perot Dole
Very Certain 372 185 313 43 26 29
(27.8%) (13.8%) (23.4%) (15.1%) (9.2%) (10.3%)
Pretty Certain 629 459 592 97 58 74
(47.0%) (34.3%) (44.3%) (34.2%) (20.5%) (26.2%)
Not Very Certain 337 694 433 144 199 180
(25.2%) (51.9%) (32.4%) (50.7%) (70.3%) (63.6%)
* This is the subsample of respondents that
do not place themselves on the ideology scale.
Table 3.7: Sample and Subsample: Respondent Uncertainty (Directly Measured)
2000 Presidential Candidate Ideological Positions
Full Sample Subsample*
Candidate Gore Bush Gore Bush
Very Certain 284 263 10 8
(22.9%) (21.2%) (8.9%) (7.1%)
Pretty Certain 548 547 26 24
(44.1%) (44.2%) (23.0%) (21.4%)
Not Very Certain 411 429 77 80
(33.1%) (34.6%) (68.1%) (71.4%)
* This is the subsample of respondents that
do not place themselves on the ideology scale.
elections 1972{2000. The left section of the table shows the mean uncertainty about
each candidate for the full sample and the center section of the table shows the mean
uncertainty about each candidate for the subsample that would be dropped from the
analysis if the negative quadratic distance between the candidate and the respondent's
self-placement was used. The right section of the table shows the dierence between
the two measures of uncertainty.
As this table makes apparent, individuals who do not place themselves on the ide-
ology scale are consistently more uncertain about the candidates' ideological locations
than individuals who do place themselves on the ideology scale. An analysis that in-
cluded the negative quadratic distance between the individual's and the candidates'
ideological locations would drop such individuals and would therefore be based on a
much more certain set of individuals. Hence, I do not measure ideological proximity
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Table 3.8: Sample and Subsample: Respondent Uncertainty (Bartels Measure)
1972{2000 Uncertainty about Presidential Candidate Ideological Positions
Full Sample Subsample* Dierence
Mean Mean Mean
Year Candidate Uncertainty N Uncertainty N Uncertainty
1972 George McGovern -1.15 2015 .69 459 2.84
Richard Nixon -1.58 2015 .53 459 2.11
1976 Jimmy Carter -1.09 1691 .96 425 2.05
Gerald Ford -1.39 1691 .96 425 2.35
1980 Jimmy Carter -.61 1174 .04 356 .65
John Anderson -.05 1174 .62 356 .67
Ronald Reagan -.64 1174 .08 356 .72
1984 Walter Mondale -2.86 1586 -2.26 377 .60
Ronald Reagan -3.39 1586 -2.59 377 .80
1988 Michael Dukakis -1.70 1556 -.72 384 .98
George Bush -1.97 1556 -.87 384 1.10
1992 Bill Clinton -2.46 1837 -1.49 428 .97
Ross Perot -1.24 1837 -.55 428 .89
George Bush -2.78 1837 -1.63 428 1.15
1996 Bill Clinton -3.85 1262 -2.72 265 1.13
Ross Perot -1.57 1262 -1.07 265 .50
Bob Dole -3.36 1262 -2.09 265 1.27
2000 Al Gore -2.62 1203 -.46 114 2.20
George W. Bush -2.52 1203 -.34 114 2.18
* This is the subsample of respondents that do not place themselves on the ideology scale.
with the negative quadratic distance and instead use an operationalization that avoids
reliance on the individual's self-placement on the 7-point ideology scale. One method
for doing this is imputation. However, as ideological placement is a perception and
thus a non-objective variable that is not well enough predicted by the other variables
in the NES dataset to be satisfactorily imputed, I do not use this method.
Fortunately, I am able to accurately operationalize the individual's ideological
proximity to the candidate using two measures of the individual's political prefer-
ences that are strongly related to ideological self-placement: partisan identication
and ideological self-categorization. Previous research has shown that both ideology
(see Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet (1944)) and partisanship (see Campbell, Con-
verse, Miller and Stokes (1964) and Bartels (2000)) strongly predict vote choice. The
partisan identication variable was formed using respondents' answers to the question
\Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat,
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an Independent, or what?" Those that answered Republican were coded -1, those
that answered Democrat were coded +1, and those that answered neither were coded
0.
The ideological categorization variable was formed by respondents' answers to two
related questions. If they placed themselves on the seven-point ideology scale it was
formed using that answer, where positions 1{3 were designated \liberal," position
4 was designated \moderate," and positions 5{7 were designated \conservative." If
they did not place themselves on the ideology scale they were asked \If you had to
choose, would you consider yourself a liberal or a conservative?" Those that replied
to this question \conservative" and those that were designated by their ideological
placements conservative were coded a -1, those that replied to this question \liberal"
and those that were designated by their ideological placements liberal were coded a
+1, and those that replied to this question as neither \conservative" nor \liberal"
and those that were designated by their ideological placements moderate were coded
a 0. Thus, each of these three variables is expected to have a positive coeÆcient
when predicting the utility of voting for the Democratic candidate and a negative
coeÆcient when predicting the utility of voting for the Republican candidate.
3.1.3 The Costs of Voting
The costs of voting include costs of nding out about the election (the issues, where
to register, when to vote, etc.), costs of taking the time necessary to vote as well as
institutionally imposed costs. I measure these as being a function of eight variables:
six that are the product of individual attributes and two that are the product of insti-
tutional conditions. The former set of six variables is composed of: the respondent's
age, education level, family income, whether or not she watched programs about the
campaign on television and whether or not she frequently watches the national news
on television or reads a daily newspaper. The latter set of two variables is: the state
registration deadline and whether or not the state allows citizens to register at the
DMV.
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The respondent's age is measured in years. It corresponds to her general level of
experience both in evaluating political candidates and in dealing with the type of gov-
ernment bureaucracies involved in elections. The respondent's education is measured
using three indicator variables denoting levels of education { a high school degree,
some college coursework, or a junior college degree, and a Bachelor of Arts degree.
Education has been shown (Rosenstone and Hanson (1993) and Alvarez and Brehm
(1995)) to have a particularly strong impact on one's ability to gather and process po-
litical information. The respondent's family income is similarly measured using three
indicator variables that roughly correspond to the second, third and fourth sample in-
come quartiles. Because of ination, these range from $5,000{$9,000, $9,000{$15,000
and $15,000+ per year in 1972 to $25,000{$50,000, $50,000{$75,000 and $75,000+
per year in 2000. Family income relates both to the costs of acquiring sources of
information as well as to the opportunity costs of the time spent voting.
The costs of acquiring information through the media are measured by the respon-
dent's attention to the newspaper, television news and programs about the campaign.
Each of these is measured with an indicator variable. The newspaper variable is coded
a 1 if the respondent reports normally reading a daily newspaper 5{7 times per week
for the years 1984{2000. For the previous two election years the question was changed
so as not to record how many days per week the respondent read a daily newspaper
but only if she read a daily newspaper. Accordingly, the variable is coded a 1 for
40{50% of the sample from 1984{2000 and 65{72% of the sample from 1976{1980.
Unfortunately, the NES changed the question in 1972 so that it could not be used to
measure normal respondent newspaper attention.
Likewise, the television national news variable is coded a 1 if the respondent
reports normally watching the national news 5{7 times per week for the years 1984{
2000. In both 1976 and 1980, the question was asked dierently, so that for 1980
the variable is coded a 1 if the respondent reports watching the national news every
night and for 1976 it is coded a 1 if the respondent reports watching the national
news frequently. For this reason, the variable is coded a 1 for approximately 40{60%
of the sample from 1984{2000, 38% in 1980 and 54% in 1976. In 1972 the NES did
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not ask the question and so it is not included in the analysis for that year.
The campaign programs variable is coded a 1 if the respondent reports having
watched any television programs about the election campaign. The NES asked this
question in surveys between 1992{2000 and 1976{1984. Accordingly, it does not
appear in the 1988 or 1972 analyses. For the elections that it is included, it is coded
a 1 for 75{89% of the survey respondents.
The two institutional variables are the state registration deadline and whether
or not the state allows eligible voters to register at the DMV. Once the National
Voter Registration Act (NVRA) was enacted in 1993, states were required to institute
DMV registration unless they allowed election day registration at the polling place.
5
Thus, in the 1996 and 2000 data the variance in the indicator variable I use to
denote the presence of DMV registration in a respondent's state virtually disappears.
Furthermore, it became strongly correlated with the registration deadline. For this
reason, I do not include it in the 1996 and 2000 analyses.
Between 1972 and 1992, the number of states with DMV registration increased
steadily. In 1972 only one state permitted DMV registration { Illinois. Four years
later Pennsylvania and Washington D.C. also permitted DMV registration. In 1980
Minnesota instituted DMV registration and in 1984 Arizona and North Carolina
followed suit. Eight years later, in 1992, 19 states had provisions allowing DMV
registration. Thus, across the years there is a fair amount of change (and variance)
in the number of states allowing DMV registration.
State registration deadlines followed a similar although less dramatic trend. In
1972 only one state (Maine) allowed registration on election day and the average
registration deadline was 25.5 days. Following the implementation of the NVRA
many states reformed their registration process so that by 2000 six states allowed
registration on election day (Idaho, Maine, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin,
and Wyoming) and the average registration deadline was 21.8 days. This decline in
the length of the registration deadline suggests that it presents less of a barrier to
5
This exempted Minnesota, Wisconsin, Wyoming, Idaho, and New Hampshire. North Dakota
was exempted because it does not have voter registration.
35
turnout in recent Presidential elections than it did in earlier Presidential elections.
So as not to impose an overly linear structure on the eect of the registration
deadline on the vote decision I measure it with two variables, the rst denoting the
number of days that the deadline falls before the election and the second being the
square root of the rst. This attempts to capture the likely non-linear shape of the
eect of the registration deadline { one that is marginally decreasing in the length of
the deadline.
In the next and nal section of this chapter, I introduce the statistical model used
for this analysis. This will cover the last important aspect of how I test the model
presented in the previous chapter. In subsequent chapters I will proceed to discuss
the results and ndings of the empirical estimation.
3.2 The Statistical Model
The model of the vote decision discussed in Chapter 2 demonstrates that citizens gen-
erally face a choice between three actions on election day: voting for the Democratic
candidate, voting for the Republican candidate, and abstaining. The statistical model
that is appropriate for analyzing this decision is therefore a polychotomous limited-
dependent variable model such as the conditional multinomial logit. The dependent
variable of this model codes each of the three choices described above separately, is
built on the assumption that the errors are distributed logistically, and is consistent
with a random utility framework that incorporates the vote decision model.
Unfortunately, this model cannot be applied without accounting for the potentially
endogenous relationship between vote choice and uncertainty. This endogeneity is
the product of two aspects of information gathering. The rst involves the eects of
costs of information. Individuals who have high costs of information may rationally
choose to pay attention only to information about one particular candidate if they
expect that by doing so they will be persuaded to vote for that candidate (Downs
(1957)). In this way, such individuals maximize their utility by making an expected
correct vote decision while minimizing the costs of information that they incur. The
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result of such strategic information gathering is that many voters are likely to be
substantially less uncertain about the candidate for whom they vote than for the
competing candidate(s).
Another potential cause of endogeneity between uncertainty and vote choice is
described by Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet (1944), as they found many of the
subjects in their study practicing \selective information processing." Such subjects
were more likely to pay attention to information that was favorable to their preferred
candidate. This behavior is similar to that described in theories of how the media
inuences voter information gathering (Graber (1988) and Patterson (1980)). Voters
engaged in this behavior are expected to be relatively less uncertain of their preferred
candidate the earlier they make their vote decision, as this allows them to practice
\selective information processing" for a longer span of the election campaign.
To account for this endogeneity I use two-stage estimation (a discussion of this
can be found in Greene (1997)) of the following set of equations:
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I assume that the institutional variables (the registration deadline and whether
or not the state allows DMV registration) may be represented by the matrix X
i2
above, and have no direct causal relationship with uncertainty, thus satisfying the
exclusion conditions necessary to ensure that the set of equations is identied. Unfor-
tunately, no research has been published on the properties of two-stage estimation of
two limited-dependent variable models. A number of econometricians and method-
ologists, including Achen (1986), Alvarez and Glasgow (2000), Amemiya (1978), and
Rivers and Vuong (1988) discuss two-stage estimation where one of the models has a
limited-dependent variable. They demonstrate that the coeÆcient estimates obtained
from this model are consistent, although the standard errors are likely to be biased.
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Nonetheless, from their applications of the model, Alvarez and Glasgow (2000) con-
clude that the two-stage estimation yields small sample results that are superior to
those of alternative models.
The other important methodological issue concerns the second-stage estimated
standard errors. As shown by Achen (1986) and discussed by Alvarez and Glasgow
(2000), two-stage estimation of a set of simultaneous structural equations with a
limited-dependent variable model is likely to yield biased standard errors. Further,
little is known about the asymptotic properties of estimates involving two limited-
dependent variable models.
Yet statistical inference relies upon estimates of standard errors, making it im-
portant to produce trustworthy variance results. Accordingly, I generate the stan-
dard errors presented in the following chapters by bootstrapping (re-sampling with
replacement and then calculating the variance across estimates), both the rst and
second-stage models simultaneously. As discussed by Mooney and Duval (1993), boot-
strapping involves empirically estimating the entire sampling distribution of model
parameters, thereby avoiding dependence upon potentially unrealistic model assump-
tions. As boot-strapped estimates of standard errors are generally consistent, this
technique enables me to incorporate statistical inference into the discussion that fol-
lows.
Accordingly, the estimation that I use is a two-stage estimation of (rst) a logit
model to predict the reduced-form uncertainty equation and (second) a conditional
multinomial logit model to predict the vote decision.
6
Although the multinomial logit
imposes a more restrictive error variance covariance structure than the multinomial
probit, its computational ease makes it advantageous to estimate. Furthermore, as
I am not interested in measuring the eects of changing the choice set, I am not
concerned by the fact that the restriction on the error variance covariance matrix
entails the IIA assumption.
The results of my estimation are described in detail in the next chapter. I will
6
For the years 1972{1992 this is a binary logit on the reduced-form of the Bartels measure of
uncertainty and for the years 1996{2000 this is an ordered logit on the reduced-form of the direct
measure of uncertainty.
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briey describe the rst-stage results, but I will focus most closely on the second-stage
results, as it is these that are relevant to the model of the vote decision proposed ear-
lier. I will discuss how these results relate to the three proposed hypotheses using not
only the model estimates but also rst dierences and whole-sample counterfactual
simulations.
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Chapter 4 The Empirical Results
The rst-stage estimates of the reduced-form models predicting individuals' uncer-
tainty about each of the candidates are shown in Tables A.1{A.8 in the appendix.
The results of these models provide strong evidence that costs of information deter-
mine eligible voter's uncertainty about candidate ideology. Most of the coeÆcients on
the variables measuring respondent's education, family income and news or campaign
coverage attention are both negative and statistically signicant (none are both pos-
itive and statistically signicant). This indicates that the hypothesized relationship
between these variables, the costs of information and uncertainty about the candi-
dates is correctly specied.
The results also demonstrate moderate support for the theories that explain the
existence of endogeneity between vote choice and uncertainty. These theories, which
are described in Section 3.2, suggest that voters engage in selective information pro-
cessing and strategic information gathering. Hence, they are likely to be relatively
less uncertain of the candidate they prefer than the candidates they do not prefer.
Some evidence for this is shown by the eects of variables measuring strength and
direction of partisan attachment { although conclusions drawn from these variables
are mitigated by the synonymous roles of party strategy and strategic information
gathering in inuencing uncertainty. More substantial evidence is given by the eects
of variables measuring decision timing. Individuals deciding to vote early in the cam-
paign for a candidate are often less uncertain about that candidate than otherwise,
demonstrating that they engage in selective information gathering after making their
decisions.
Further detail and discussion of these models may be found in the appendix.
They are not given more consideration here simply because they reiterate the results
of similar models described by Alvarez (1997), Alvarez and Franklin (1994), Alvarez
and Glasgow (2000) and Bartels (1986).
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4.1 Second-Stage CoeÆcient Estimates
The estimates of the second-stage vote decision models are shown in Tables 4.1{4.8.
These results provide support for the vote decision model proposed in Chapter 2 as
well as correspond with the predictions of the three hypotheses yielded by that model.
In the discussion that follows, each of these models will be analyzed in turn.
Table 4.1 shows the conditional multinomial logit model estimates for the 1972 race
between Senator George McGovern and incumbent President Richard Nixon. The
results of this estimation provide evidence in favor of the vote decision model described
earlier. The direction of the ideological categorization and partisan identication are
as predicted by the ideological proximity variable in Equation 2.5. With only one
exception, each is statistically signicant at standard levels. The coeÆcient on the
candidate uncertainty variable is negative and statistically signicant, demonstrating
that uncertainty about a candidate decreases the individual's utility for voting for
that candidate.
Likewise, the results for the costs of voting variables further support this model
of voting. Nearly all of the costs of voting coeÆcients are the signs predicted by the
theory (positive for the individual-level variables and negative for the registration
requirement variables) and most are statistically signicant. The weakest results
pertain to the registration deadline variables { only the variable measuring the impact
on McGovern of DMV registration is statistically signicant. This suggests that
registration requirements may not have a huge impact on turnout and that they may
asymmetrically eect the competing candidates.
The results of the 1976 model (Table 4.2) follow a similar pattern to that of the
1972 results. Again, the ideology and partisan attachment variables show that liber-
als, weak Democrats, and strong Democrats are more likely to vote for the Democratic
candidate (in this case Carter) than conservatives, weak Republicans, and strong Re-
publicans, who are more likely to vote for the Republican candidate (in this case
Ford). Likewise, the coeÆcient on the candidate uncertainty variable is negative and
strongly signicant.
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The individual-level costs of voting variables (age, education, and family income)
also show strikingly similar inuences as in 1972. In addition to these variables are
the three news/campaign attention variables that were not available in the 1972 NES
collection. The coeÆcients on the television news and daily newspaper attention
variables are statistically insignicant while the coeÆcients on watching television
programs about the campaign are positive and statistically signicant. This indicates
that for this election such television shows had the greatest impact of all the measured
sources of information on voting behavior. Lastly, DMV registration seems to have
had no eect in 1976 whereas the registration deadline had a negative and statistically
signicant eect for the Democratic candidate, Jimmy Carter.
The 1980 and 1984 results are much less consistent and more unexpected than
those of both the previous and subsequent election years.
1
Table 4.3 contains the es-
timates for the 1980 vote model. This is the rst of three four-choice conditional logit
models (the others are for the years 1992 and 1996). Unlike for the Democratic and
Republican candidates, there is no theoretically driven expectation for the direction
of the coeÆcients on the ideological categorization and partisan attachment variables
for the third-party candidates. With respect to Carter, we see support for the role
of ideological proximity in the statistically signicant coeÆcients on weak and strong
partisan identication.
Again, the eect of candidate uncertainty is negative and statistically signicant.
Across the elections considered thus far this variable has been very consistent. The
costs of voting variables, however, exhibit a dierent trend. While the coeÆcient
on the individual's age is positive and signicant, those on the other costs of vot-
ing variables tend to be either negative and signicant or positive and statistically
insignicant. This holds true for the registration requirements where only one coeÆ-
cient is signicant { that on DMV registration for Anderson { with a negative rather
than positive sign.
The 1984 estimates shown in Table 4.4 demonstrate a less pronounced but similar
1
To be sure that these results are not caused by local maxima of the likelihood function I re-
estimated the models using various non-zero starting values and search algorithms. In each instance
the model returned the same coeÆcients shown in Tables 4.3{4.4.
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pattern. Three of the six variables indicating ideological proximity are statistically
signicant (each are the expected sign). Candidate uncertainty is again negative and
statistically signicant. The costs of voting variables are not always as predicted, as
many although not all of the individual-level variables have statistically signicant
negative rather than positive eects. The registration variables are also all statistically
insignicant.
Although the estimates for 1980 and 1984 do not corroborate the vote decision
model as fully as those for 1972 and 1976 (and, for the subsequent elections, as I
will show), they only indicate weakness among the cost of voting variables. The
cause of this weakness is unclear { most likely it arises from a shared trait between
the two elections. One possibility is the candidacy of Ronald Reagan { the only
Hollywood movie star to run for President in any of the elections I analyze. Perhaps
his popularity and appeal along non-political lines drew individuals to vote when
otherwise they would not have done so.
The results of the 1988 analysis shown in Table 4.5 are more consistent than those
just discussed with the trends of the 1972 and 1976 elections. The roles of ideological
proximity and candidate uncertainty are more strongly supported, with four of the
six coeÆcients being the expected sign and signicance. The coeÆcients on age are
positive and statistically signicant. However, the coeÆcients on the education and
family income variables and the news attention variables are rather weak. Only one
each on education and family income is statistically signicant. The coeÆcients on
the registration requirements are not statistically signicant, indicating that they did
not play a role in determining turnout in the 1988 election.
The 1992 election, like the 1980 election, included a strong third-party candidate.
The results of the analysis of this election are shown in Table 4.6. The eects of the
proximity and uncertainty variables are for the most part statistically signicant and
in accordance with the theoretical predictions regarding their inuence. The costs
of voting variables are also as expected. The coeÆcients on the age and education
variables are all positive, and with only two exceptions, statistically signicant. How-
ever, the coeÆcients on the other individual-level costs of voting variables are all
43
insignicant. Only those on the institutional cost of voting variables are signicant.
Most notably, the coeÆcients on the square root of the registration deadline are nega-
tive and statistically signicant for both Clinton and Perot, demonstrating that high
registration deadlines reduced voter utility for these candidates.
Similarly, the 1996 election was a three-candidate race that included Clinton as
the Democratic candidate (now the incumbent President) and Perot as the Reform
Party candidate. Something that sets this election apart from the previous elections
is the implementation of the NVRA in 1994. Following the NVRA, nearly all U.S.
states adopted DMV registration (hence, it is no longer a part of the analysis) and
many signicantly reduced the length of their registration deadlines.
The results of the model estimation for 1996 are shown in Table 4.7. Generally,
they are supportive of the vote decision model described earlier. The coeÆcients
on the variables measuring ideological proximity and candidate uncertainty are the
expected sign and many are statistically signicant. The variables measuring the
costs of voting generally have the expected impact, and when statistically signicant
always have the expected impact. All of the registration deadline indicators are
negative and statistically insignicant. This may be indicative of the registration
reform eorts that accompanied the NVRA.
The results of the nal election model in this analysis, the 2000 election, are shown
in Table 4.8. Again, these results are consistent with the decision-making model upon
which the study is based. The coeÆcients on the ideological proximity variables and
candidate uncertainty are the expected sign and statistically signicant. The costs
of voting variables are also generally as predicted. The one exception is attention
to television news, which signicantly decreased turnout for both candidates. In
fact, in no instance has this variable statistically signicantly increased turnout for
a candidate, suggesting some support for the claim (Clarke and Fredin (1978) and
Patterson and McClure (1976)) that television news is a poor cousin to printed news.
Although the coeÆcients on the square root of the registration deadline are negative,
neither is statistically signicant.
Overall, the results in Tables 4.1{4.8 support the model proposed in Chapter 2.
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Most remarkable in its consistency across election years is the eect of candidate
uncertainty. For each of the eight elections studied, the impact of uncertainty is
negative and statistically signicant. This demonstrates that uncertainty and infor-
mation about the candidates plays a substantial role in determining turnout and vote
choice. For this reason, its eects will be studied more closely throughout the rest of
this and the next chapters.
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Table 4.1: 1972 Vote Decision
Conditional Multinomial Logit Results
Variable Choice Specic McGovern Vote Nixon Vote
Candidate Uncertainty -0.45** (0.09)
Constant -1.67** (0.61) -2.14** (0.74)
Ideology 0.74** (0.22) -0.13 (0.22)
Weak Partisan I.D. 0.75** (0.15) -0.35** (0.12)
Strong Partisan I.D. 1.50** (0.19) -0.78** (0.16)
Age 1.66** (0.50) 3.27** (0.43)
Education
HS Degree 0.53** (0.20) 0.45** (0.16)
Some College 0.57** (0.21) 0.30* (0.18)
BA Degree 0.75* (0.39) 0.19 (0.36)
Family Income
$5K-$9K 0.25 (0.20) 0.53** (0.18)
$9K-$15K 0.33* (0.20) 0.88** (0.19)
$15K+ 0.62** (0.27) 1.22** (0.26)
DMV Registration 0.77* (0.46) 0.28 (0.47)
Registration Deadline -0.01 (0.03) 0.01 (0.03)
Sqrt Registration Deadline -0.09 (0.24) -0.08 (0.27)
log-likelihood -1622.4
observations 2015
Note: (Abstention coeÆcients normalized to zero).
Entries are maximum likelihood estimates
with associated standard errors in parenthesis.
* indicates a =.10 level of statistical signicance, two-tailed test.
** indicates a =.05 level of statistical signicance, two-tailed test.
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Table 4.2: 1976 Vote Decision
Conditional Multinomial Logit Results
Variable Choice Specic Carter Vote Ford Vote
Candidate Uncertainty -0.25** (0.07)
Constant -2.59** (0.45) -3.57** (0.51)
Ideology 0.39** (0.13) -0.47** (0.14)
Weak Partisan I.D. 0.54** (0.11) -0.56** (0.13)
Strong Partisan I.D. 1.30** (0.15) -1.41** (0.22)
Age 2.99** (0.52) 3.46** (0.53)
Education
HS Degree 0.52** (0.20) 0.59** (0.20)
Some College 0.88** (0.28) 0.99** (0.28)
BA Degree 0.40 (0.32) 0.64* (0.35)
Family Income
$6K-$12K 0.46** (0.21) 0.62** (0.24)
$12K-$20K 0.44* (0.23) 0.85** (0.23)
$20K+ 0.70** (0.29) 1.32** (0.29)
TV News 0.12 (0.15) -0.10 (0.15)
Newspaper 0.23 (0.17) 0.20 (0.22)
TV Campaign Programs 0.93** (0.22) 1.03** (0.27)
DMV Registration 0.25 (0.22) -0.13 (0.24)
Registration Deadline 0.03 (0.03) 0.01 (0.03)
Sqrt Registration Deadline -0.35** (0.17) -0.18 (0.20)
log-likelihood -1365.8
observations 1691
Note: (Abstention coeÆcients normalized to zero).
Entries are maximum likelihood estimates
with associated standard errors in parenthesis.
* indicates a =.10 level of statistical signicance, two-tailed test.
** indicates a =.05 level of statistical signicance, two-tailed test.
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Table 4.3: 1980 Vote Decision
Conditional Multinomial Logit Results
Variable Choice Specic Carter Vote Anderson Vote Reagan Vote
Candidate Uncertainty -3.05** (0.90)
Constant -0.22 (1.76) -0.49 (4.74) -0.77 (1.74)
Ideology 0.24 (0.32) 0.23 (0.35) -0.34 (0.34)
Weak Partisan I.D. 1.07** (0.42) -0.18 (0.47) 0.08 (0.44)
Strong Partisan I.D. 1.65** (0.66) 0.85 (0.65) -0.28 (0.60)
Age 3.41** (1.60) 3.13 (2.06) 2.85* (1.53)
Education
HS Degree -1.13 (0.79) 0.74 (4.41) -0.74 (0.85)
Some College -3.57** (1.40) -1.79 (4.46) -3.17** (1.49)
BA Degree -4.87** (2.20) -2.89 (4.83) -4.87** (2.37)
Family Income
$10K-$20K 0.22 (0.65) 0.12 (0.76) 0.03 (0.73)
$20K-$30K -0.71 (0.66) -1.31 (0.95) -0.39 (0.70)
$30K+ -1.11 (0.94) -0.90 (1.07) -1.83* (1.08)
TV News -0.02 (0.51) -0.68 (0.68) 0.00 (0.49)
Newspaper -0.84 (0.60) -0.45 (0.68) -0.50 (0.60)
TV Campaign Programs -0.79 (0.80) -1.27 (1.72) -0.15 (0.77)
DMV Registration 0.07 (0.82) -1.98** (0.97) -0.06 (0.89)
Registration Deadline -0.07 (0.12) 0.05 (0.13) 0.06 (0.11)
Sqrt Registration Deadline 0.49 (0.80) -0.20 (0.85) -0.12 (0.75)
log-likelihood -964.7
observations 1174
Note: (Abstention coeÆcients normalized to zero).
Entries are maximum-likelihood estimates with associated standard errors in parenthesis.
* indicates a =.10 level of statistical signicance, two-tailed test.
** indicates a =.05 level of statistical signicance, two-tailed test.
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Table 4.4: 1984 Vote Decision
Conditional Multinomial Logit Results
Variable Choice Specic Mondale Vote Reagan Vote
Candidate Uncertainty -1.50** (0.53)
Constant -5.21** (1.70) -6.54** (1.90)
Ideology -0.01 (0.26) -0.66* (0.38)
Weak Partisan I.D. 1.03** (0.33) -0.15 (0.43)
Strong Partisan I.D. 1.55** (0.34) 0.57 (0.75)
Age 5.81** (1.66) 4.51** (1.29)
Education
HS Degree 0.59 (0.41) 0.66 (0.41)
Some College -0.43 (0.78) -0.20 (0.85)
BA Degree 0.42 (1.18) -1.04 (1.67)
Family Income
$10K-$22K 0.27 (0.51) -0.12 (0.54)
$22K-$35K -0.95* (0.55) 0.07 (0.56)
$35K+ -0.59 (0.67) -0.11 (0.91)
TV News -0.22 (0.42) 0.48 (0.46)
Newspaper -0.13 (0.52) 0.09 (0.39)
TV Campaign Programs -0.33 (0.71) -0.66 (0.74)
DMV Registration -0.37 (0.62) -0.76 (0.77)
Registration Deadline 0.12 (0.10) -0.01 (0.09)
Sqrt Registration Deadline -0.83 (0.61) 0.15 (0.60)
log-likelihood -1108.5
observations 1586
Note: (Abstention coeÆcients normalized to zero).
Entries are maximum likelihood estimates
with associated standard errors in parenthesis.
* indicates a =.10 level of statistical signicance, two-tailed test.
** indicates a =.05 level of statistical signicance, two-tailed test.
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Table 4.5: 1988 Vote Decision
1988 Conditional Multinomial Logit Results
Variable Choice Specic Dukakis Vote Bush Vote
Candidate Uncertainty -1.08** (0.24)
Constant -3.20** (0.85) -3.28** (0.87)
Ideology 0.09 (0.15) -0.62** (0.17)
Weak Partisan I.D. 0.21 (0.20) -0.58** (0.20)
Strong Partisan I.D. 1.54** (0.29) -0.94** (0.31)
Age 4.26** (0.99) 4.30** (0.97)
Education
HS Degree 0.49 (0.32) 0.42 (0.32)
Some College 0.19 (0.46) 0.08 (0.52)
BA Degree 1.24** (0.48) 0.81 (0.57)
Family Income
$12K-$25K 0.08 (0.29) 0.04 (0.31)
$25K-$40K 0.15 (0.41) 0.21 (0.41)
$40K+ -0.21 (0.40) 0.84* (0.44)
TV News -0.12 (0.32) -0.44 (0.32)
Newspaper -0.12 (0.28) -0.15 (0.30)
DMV Registration -0.02 (0.28) -0.45 (0.32)
Registration Deadline -0.04 (0.07) -0.05 (0.07)
Sqrt Registration Deadline 0.02 (0.43) 0.04 (0.43)
log-likelihood -1055.2
observations 1556
Note: (Abstention coeÆcients normalized to zero).
Entries are maximum likelihood estimates
with associated standard errors in parenthesis.
* indicates a =.10 level of statistical signicance, two-tailed test.
** indicates a =.05 level of statistical signicance, two-tailed test.
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Table 4.6: 1992 Vote Decision
Conditional Multinomial Logit Results
Variable Choice Specic Clinton Vote Perot Vote Bush Vote
Candidate Uncertainty -1.40** (0.31)
Constant -5.05** (0.94) -4.32** (0.95) -4.34** (1.01)
Ideology 0.38** (0.16) -0.13 (0.13) -0.69** (0.20)
Weak Partisan I.D. 0.60** (0.20) 0.00 (0.24) -0.37 (0.26)
Strong Partisan I.D. 1.66** (0.35) 0.11 (0.28) -0.27 (0.52)
Age 6.19** (1.23) 4.38** (1.14) 4.81** (1.07)
Education
HS Degree 1.54** (0.37) 0.91** (0.38) 0.58 (0.42)
Some College 1.52** (0.46) 1.40** (0.41) 1.08** (0.51)
BA Degree 1.16 (0.74) 1.08** (0.48) 0.18 (0.87)
Family Income
$13K-$30K -0.08 (0.36) 0.51 (0.42) -0.28 (0.39)
$30K-$50K -0.07 (0.43) 0.70 (0.45) 0.21 (0.46)
$50K+ -0.49 (0.45) 0.79 (0.50) 0.12 (0.49)
TV News -0.21 (0.33) -0.19 (0.26) 0.04 (0.31)
Newspaper -0.04 (0.35) 0.40 (0.27) -0.15 (0.33)
TV Campaign Programs 0.31 (0.42) 0.69 (0.45) -0.26 (0.50)
DMV Registration -0.15 (0.28) 0.02 (0.24) -0.08 (0.29)
Registration Deadline 0.12* (0.07) 0.10* (0.06) 0.06 (0.08)
Sqrt Registration Deadline -1.01** (0.47) -0.92** (0.42) -0.77 (0.50)
log-likelihood -1575.7
observations 1837
Note: (Abstention coeÆcients normalized to zero).
Entries are maximum-likelihood estimates with associated standard errors in parenthesis.
* indicates a =.10 level of statistical signicance, two-tailed test.
** indicates a =.05 level of statistical signicance, two-tailed test.
51
Table 4.7: 1996 Vote Decision
1996 Conditional Multinomial Logit Results
Variable Choice Specic Clinton Vote Perot Vote Dole Vote
Candidate Uncertainty -1.84** (0.45)
Constant -4.76** (0.63) -6.31* (3.38) -8.36** (1.00)
Ideology 0.23* (0.14) -0.07 (0.16) -1.15** (0.18)
Weak Partisan I.D. 1.07** (0.26) 0.19 (0.29) -0.29 (0.29)
Strong Partisan I.D. 1.53** (0.29) 0.08 (0.42) -1.85** (0.42)
Age 3.47** (0.91) 3.09** (1.18) 4.92** (0.98)
Education
HS Degree 0.13 (0.46) 1.68 (3.33) 1.44** (0.57)
Some College 0.64 (0.54) 1.76 (3.36) 1.18* (0.66)
BA Degree 1.23** (0.52) 1.96 (3.36) 1.89** (0.64)
Family Income
$15K-$30K 0.56* (0.33) 0.55 (0.49) 0.57 (0.44)
$30K-$50K 0.59* (0.33) 0.01 (0.49) 0.56 (0.51)
$50K+ 1.01** (0.37) 0.82* (0.45) 1.09** (0.49)
TV News 0.02 (0.28) -0.50 (0.45) -0.17 (0.29)
Newspaper -0.01 (0.27) -0.37 (0.38) 0.13 (0.34)
TV Campaign Programs -0.07 (0.34) 0.42 (0.35) -0.06 (0.36)
Registration Deadline -0.02 (0.07) 0.15 (0.11) 0.07 (0.08)
Sqrt Registration Deadline -0.03 (0.41) -0.89 (0.63) -0.37 (0.48)
log-likelihood -990.4
observations 1340
Note: (Abstention coeÆcients normalized to zero).
Entries are maximum-likelihood estimates with associated standard errors in parenthesis.
* indicates a =.10 level of statistical signicance, two-tailed test.
** indicates a =.05 level of statistical signicance, two-tailed test.
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Table 4.8: 2000 Vote Decision
2000 Conditional Multinomial Logit Results
Variable Choice Specic Gore Vote Bush Vote
Candidate Uncertainty -1.60** (0.41)
Constant -3.73** (0.65) -4.43** (0.76)
Ideology 0.49** (0.14) -0.48** (0.16)
Weak Partisan I.D. 1.33** (0.28) -0.55** (0.24)
Strong Partisan I.D. 1.65** (0.29) -1.12** (0.36)
Age 2.44** (0.75) 3.08** (0.93)
Education
HS Degree 0.30 (0.39) -0.38 (0.45)
Some College 0.31 (0.44) -0.48 (0.54)
BA Degree 1.00* (0.55) -0.49 (0.67)
Family Income
$25K-$50K 0.13 (0.33) 0.56 (0.35)
$50K-$75K 0.60* (0.34) 0.73** (0.35)
$75K+ -0.02 (0.43) 0.94** (0.46)
TV News -0.54* (0.32) -0.87** (0.36)
Newspaper 0.28 (0.26) 0.35 (0.24)
TV Campaign Programs 0.15 (0.32) 0.28 (0.36)
Registration Deadline 0.07 (0.05) 0.03 (0.05)
Sqrt Registration Deadline -0.46 (0.32) -0.24 (0.32)
log-likelihood -809.6
observations 1250
Note: (Abstention coeÆcients normalized to zero).
Entries are maximum likelihood estimates
with associated standard errors in parenthesis.
* indicates a =.10 level of statistical signicance, two-tailed test.
** indicates a =.05 level of statistical signicance, two-tailed test.
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4.2 Eects of Uncertainty
One aspect of these results that is not easily observable from the estimates shown
in Tables 4.1{4.8 is the relative magnitude of the impact of uncertainty on the in-
dividual's probability of abstaining or voting for one or another candidate. This is
because the probability that an individual chooses any one option in the conditional
multinomial logit model is determined by a non-linear function of the exponent of
the expected utilities generated by the independent variables. Thus, while the most
salient aspects of a coeÆcient, its sign and whether or not it is statistically dierent
from zero, are immediately knowable from looking at results like those shown in Ta-
bles 4.1{4.8 , an understanding of the impact of each of the independent variables on
the individual's probable choice is not so easily gained.
For this I turn to another way of presenting the results of a conditional multinomial
logit model, the \rst dierences" for each of the independent variables shown in
Tables 4.9{4.16.
2
The \rst dierence" methodology is relatively simple (King, 1989).
Here each independent variable is set to the sample mean value and with this the
probability that a hypothetical \representative citizen" would choose a particular
action (to abstain, vote for the Democratic candidate or vote for the Republican
candidate) is determined. Then, for any given independent variable (for example,
age) the value of that variable is increased by one sample standard deviation and the
probability that the hypothetical citizen chooses each possible action is calculated.
The dierence between these two probability estimates provides the \rst dierence,"
which can be thought of as an estimate of the impact on the outcome of a standard
deviation change in one independent variable, holding all other eects in the model
constant.
Tables 4.9{4.16 show the results of this exercise for four variables: ideology, un-
certainty, age and the registration deadline.
3
The other variables are omitted from
2
The estimates of the standard errors in this and subsequent tables are produced by re-sampling.
I drew 100 samples using re-sampling of the dataset, estimated the coeÆcients on each variable and
then estimated the rst dierences described above. The reported probabilities are the probabilities
calculated for the original dataset and the reported standard errors are the standard deviations from
the mean of the estimated probabilities across the 100 draws.
3
For ideology the rst dierence shows the eect of changing from a moderate to a liberal on the
54
the rst dierence analysis because they are not continuous variables, hence, a sam-
ple standard deviation shift requires a discrete jump from one categorical level (for
example, an individual with a high school education) to another categorical level (con-
tinuing the example: an individual with a B.A. degree). In almost every case such
a shift encompasses much more than just a one sample standard deviation change
{ therefore across variables the magnitude of the eects of such rst dierences is
incomparable.
As the results of Tables 4.9{4.16 show, the eects of ideological categorization are
much stronger for vote choice than abstention. In fact, for every year the impact of
ideology was not statistically dierent from zero. Furthermore, every year shows the
same direction of impact: a statistically signicant increase in the probability of voting
for the Democrat accompanied by a statistically signicant decrease in the probability
of voting for the Republican. For the third candidate in the three-candidate races the
eect was never statistically signicant. With regards to Perot, this nding is similar
to that of Lacy and Burden (1999).
The results of the rst dierences demonstrate a similarly consistent trend in the
impact of age on abstention. In each year, (except 1980, where the eect is not sig-
nicant), the eect of an increase in age is to statistically signicantly decrease the
likelihood of abstention (providing limited support for Hypothesis 3). The magni-
tude of this eect varies in its relation to the magnitude of the eects of candidate
uncertainty. The impact of age on vote choice also diers across elections. In 1972,
1976, and 1984, it advantaged Republican candidates (Nixon, Ford, and Reagan) at
the expense of Democratic candidates. Conversely in 1988, 1992, and 1996 it advan-
taged Democratic candidates (Dukakis and Clinton) at the expense of Republican
candidates. Finally, in 2000 it again advantaged the Republican candidate, George
W. Bush. It is possible that this trend indicates a gradual shift attributable to gen-
erational replacement.
The rst dierences on candidate uncertainty are remarkably robust with regard
both to abstention and vote choice. Increasing by one sample standard deviation
probability of abstention and vote choice.
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uncertainty about each candidate (separately) raises the likelihood that the represen-
tative citizen abstains. The only exceptions to this are uncertainty about Mondale
in the 1984 election, and uncertainty about Perot in the 1996 election, which had in-
signicant eects on abstention. Nonetheless, taken as a whole these results provide
substantial support for Hypothesis 1 as they demonstrate that the eect of increasing
uncertainty about a candidate is to decrease an individual's probability of turnout.
The eects of uncertainty about a candidate on vote choice are remarkably similar
across elections in terms of their direction and statistical signicance. Increasing
uncertainty about each candidate analyzed in these models signicantly decreases
the probability of voting for that candidate. Likewise, it signicantly increases the
probability of voting for the other major candidates in all cases except four in 1996.
The inuence of candidate uncertainty on vote choice indicates support for Hypothesis
2, as decreasing uncertainty for a candidate raises probable turnout for that candidate
and decreases probable turnout for opposing candidates.
It is interesting to observe that the eects of uncertainty on candidate choice rise
over the course of the elections studied. This is evidence in favor of the claims made
both by political scientists and media pundits that election coverage increasingly
contains less information about political candidates and current issues (Patterson
(1980)) and more u or \horse race" content. However, it is also important to
note that the magnitude of the inuence of uncertainty on vote choice rise most
in the 1980 and 1984 elections. The largest impact is on the probability of voting
for Reagan, which decreases by 75.5 percentage points in 1980, and 48.0 percentage
points in 1984, due to a standard deviation increase in uncertainty about Reagan.
As discussed before, this may be related to Reagan's status as a famous Hollywood
actor. Awareness of his acting career may have gone hand-in-hand with favorable
perceptions of his candidacy.
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Table 4.9: Eects of Each Independent Variable on 1972 Choice
First Dierences
Variable Abstains McGovern Vote Nixon Vote
Ideology -1.9 (3.0) +14.4** (4.3) -12.5** (4.4)
Candidate Uncertainty
McGovern Uncertainty +3.1** (0.6) -12.1** (3.3) +9.0** (2.9)
Nixon Uncertainty +13.3** (2.0) +10.0** (3.2) -23.3** (4.4)
Age -8.8** (1.8) -1.9 (1.4) +10.7** (2.1)
Registration Deadline +0.7 (1.5) -2.0 (1.3) +1.3 (2.0)
Note: First Dierence estimates based on
conditional multinomial logit estimates in Table 4.1.
Table 4.10: Eects of Each Independent Variable on 1976 Choice
First Dierences
Variable Abstains Carter Vote Ford Vote
Ideology -0.4 (2.2) +15.7** (2.7) -15.3** (2.1)
Candidate Uncertainty
Carter Uncertainty +4.7** (1.3) -12.1** (3.3) +7.4** (2.2)
Ford Uncertainty +6.1** (1.6) +8.4** (2.5) -14.5** (3.8)
Age -11.0** (1.6) +3.6* (2.0) +7.4** (2.1)
Registration Deadline +0.7 (3.1) -0.2 (3.8) -0.5 (4.2)
Note: First Dierence estimates based on
conditional multinomial logit estimates in Table 4.2.
Table 4.11: Eects of Each Independent Variable on 1980 Choice
First Dierences
Variable Abstains Carter Vote Anderson Vote Reagan Vote
Ideology +0.5 (2.8) +8.6* (4.8) +4.2 (4.1) -13.4** (4.3)
Candidate Uncertainty
Carter Uncertainty +6.8* (3.5) -62.2** (14.9) +10.5** (5.3) +44.8** (14.1)
Anderson Uncertainty +4.5* (2.7) +13.8** (5.8) -48.2** (16.3) +29.9** (11.2)
Reagan Uncertainty +13.5** (5.5) +41.1** (13.0) +20.9** (8.8) -75.5** (12.4)
Age -4.4 (3.4) +3.0 (3.0) +0.8 (3.2) +0.6 (4.8)
Registration Deadline -1.5 (3.3) -9.0 (5.4) +0.9 (3.7) +9.5 (5.7)
Note: First Dierence estimates based on
conditional multinomial logit estimates in Table 4.3.
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Table 4.12: Eects of Each Independent Variable on 1984 Choice
First Dierences
Variable Abstains Mondale Vote Reagan Vote
Ideology +9.9 (6.6) +6.2 (4.3) -16.2** (6.9)
Candidate Uncertainty
Mondale Uncertainty +5.6 (3.5) -21.6** (10.4) +16.0* (8.4)
Reagan Uncertainty +29.3** (8.6) +18.7** (9.2) -48.0** (13.6)
Age -14.8** (4.3) +5.4 (3.7) +9.4** (4.7)
Registration Deadline -1.8 (6.6) +3.2 (4.6) -1.3 (6.6)
Note: First Dierence estimates based on
conditional multinomial logit estimates in Table 4.4.
Table 4.13: Eects of Each Independent Variable on 1988 Choice
First Dierences
Variable Abstains Dukakis Vote Bush Vote
Ideology +3.6 (3.9) +6.9* (3.6) -10.6** (2.6)
Candidate Uncertainty
Dukakis Uncertainty +19.1** (4.8) -31.6** (7.0) +12.5** (4.2)
Bush Uncertainty +15.4** (4.1) +13.8** (4.7) -29.2** (7.1)
Age -18.6** (4.0) +10.6** (3.3) +8.0** (2.7)
Registration Deadline +7.7* (4.6) -3.8 (3.5) -4.0 (3.3)
Note: First Dierence estimates based on
conditional multinomial logit estimates in Table 4.5.
Table 4.14: Eects of Each Independent Variable on 1992 Choice
First Dierences
Variable Abstains Clinton Vote Perot Vote Bush Vote
Ideology -1.2 (2.8) +15.9** (3.8) -2.2 (1.6) -12.5** (3.0)
Candidate Uncertainty
Clinton Uncertainty +16.2** (4.0) -42.6** (8.6) +9.4** (3.2) +17.0** (4.4)
Perot Uncertainty +4.0* (2.3) +7.2** (2.5) -15.3** (5.2) +4.2** (1.5)
Bush Uncertainty +10.8** (3.9) +19.5** (5.0) +6.3** (2.3) -36.6** (8.8)
Age -18.0** (4.4) +15.0* (3.3) +0.4 (2.2) +2.7 (2.6)
Registration Deadline -0.9 (3.8) +3.5 (4.4) +0.6 (2.6) -3.1 (3.8)
Note: First Dierence estimates based on
conditional multinomial logit estimates in Table 4.6.
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Table 4.15: Eects of Each Independent Variable on 1996 Choice
First Dierences
Variable Abstains Clinton Vote Perot Vote Dole Vote
Ideology -1.4 (2.7) +10.7** (4.2) -0.7 (1.1) -8.6* (4.8)
Candidate Uncertainty
Clinton Uncertainty +21.0** (6.0) -35.6** (7.0) +5.0 (3.3) +9.6** (3.4)
Perot Uncertainty +1.4 (1.0) +2.9 (1.9) -5.0* (3.0) +0.7 (0.7)
Dole Uncertainty +5.5* (2.9) +11.1** (3.7) +1.3 (1.3) -17.9** (6.5)
Age -12.8** (3.7) +7.5** (3.7) +0.5 (1.4) +4.8 (3.3)
Registration Deadline +2.4 (4.0) +1.5 (4.8) -2.6 (2.4) -1.4 (2.6)
Note: First Dierence estimates based on
conditional multinomial logit estimates in Table 4.7.
Table 4.16: Eects of Each Independent Variable on 2000 Choice
First Dierences
Variable Abstains Gore Vote Bush Vote
Ideology -2.1 (3.6) +17.5** (3.5) -15.4** (3.8)
Candidate Uncertainty
Gore Uncertainty +13.1** (4.5) -29.2** (7.4) +16.1** (5.3)
Bush Uncertainty +14.9** (5.2) +17.1** (5.7) -32.0** (7.8)
Age -9.9** (2.9) +2.8 (3.0) +7.0** (3.4)
Registration Deadline -3.1 (4.3) +4.9 (4.3) -1.8 (4.3)
Note: First Dierence estimates based on
conditional multinomial logit estimates in Table 4.8.
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The inuence of candidate uncertainty on abstention and vote choice are shown
graphically for each candidate in the 1972 and 2000 elections in Figures 4.1{4.4.
These elections are selected simply because they are the rst and last in the series
analyzed. All show the eect of candidate uncertainty on the probable vote action
of the representative individual. The pattern in each is strikingly similar: increasing
uncertainty about a given candidate decreases both the probability of turnout and
the probability of voting for that candidate while increasing the probability of voting
for the opposing candidate.
It is the dierences between these gures that may be most illuminating. The ef-
fects of uncertainty about the 2000 candidates (Gore and Bush) in Figures 4.3{4.4 are
graphically quite similar: as uncertainty about a candidate increases, turnout declines
and support for each candidate decreases and increases, respectively, in S-shaped
curves that intersect in the middle of each gure. This indicates fairly symmetric
eects of uncertainty on the vote for each candidate.
In contrast, the graphs for the 1972 candidates appear somewhat dierent. In
Figure 4.1 the intersection of the probable vote choice curves as related to uncertainty
about McGovern appears to the left of the graph midpoint, indicating that Nixon
beneted rather quickly from uncertainty about McGovern. Moreover, the probable
vote choice curves in Figure 4.2 relating to uncertainty about Nixon barely intersect
at the maximal level of uncertainty, indicating that even when the median voter was
extremely uncertain about Nixon, she was more likely to cast her vote for him than for
McGovern. This demonstrates the importance of other variables in shaping candidate
preference. As McGovern was notoriously left-wing, he alienated voters to such an
extent that even drastic changes in uncertainty about Nixon could not suÆciently
alter vote choice so as to yield him much electoral support.
These gures provide further support for the statements in Hypothesis 1 and Hy-
pothesis 2. Nonetheless, all of the hypotheses in those statements pertain to aggregate
behavior among the entire population of eligible voters. Therefore, to accurately eval-
uate them we turn to the whole-sample simulations detailed in the next section of
this chapter.
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Figure 4.1: The Eect of Uncertainty about McGovern on the 1972 Vote Decision
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Figure 4.2: The Eect of Uncertainty about Nixon on the 1972 Vote Decision
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Figure 4.3: The Eect of Uncertainty about Gore on the 2000 Vote Decision
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Figure 4.4: The Eect of Uncertainty about Bush on the 2000 Vote Decision
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4.3 Counterfactual Simulations
In this section I discuss direct evidence relating to the three hypotheses that result
from the formal model and are set forth in Chapter 2. I do this by estimating the
eects of changes in uncertainty and the registration requirements on the national rate
of turnout and candidates' vote shares. This is done with counterfactual simulations
that are based on the entire dataset for each election and the corresponding estimated
conditional multinomial logit coeÆcients shown in Tables 4.1{4.8.
The counterfactual simulations are used to demonstrate the eects of changes in
selected independent variables on population aggregated turnout and vote choice.
This entails rst predicting baseline choice probabilities using the original, unaltered
independent variables. Next, one or more independent variables are set to selected
values and the individual choice probabilities are re-calculated. The dierence be-
tween these predictions and those of the baseline prediction indicate the eect of the
change on the vote decisions of the sample population.
4
In the tables that follow I show the results of this for two basic sorts of changes:
one individual and one institutional. The rst is a change in the level of uncertainty
across the electorate and the second is a change in the institutional barrier imposed
by registration requirements. To produce the counterfactual regarding uncertainty
for the 1972{1992 election data I set the level of uncertainty (about each candidate
separately) of each individual in the dataset to equal the mean level of uncertainty of
those who place the candidate on the ideology scale (rather than refuse to do so). To
produce the same counterfactual for the 1996{2000 data I set each level of uncertainty
to equal the mean of those reporting to be either \pretty certain" or \very certain."
Likewise, to produce the counterfactual regarding registration requirements I set the
registration deadline to zero and the DMV registration indicator variable to one in
every state analyzed.
The results of this exercise are shown in Tables 4.17{4.24. The rst row of each
table shows the baseline predicted rates of abstention and turnout for each candidate.
4
The calculated rate of turnout and candidate support is the average probability of choosing each
action across all of the individuals in the dataset.
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Obviously, the predicted rates of abstention are quite a bit lower than those indicated
by the FEC reported rates of turnout in Table 1.1. In fact, they range between
15.2 percentage points (in 1972) and 26.0 percentage points (in 1996) lower than the
government estimates. The two well-documented reasons for this, respondent over-
report and changes in respondent behavior due to the pre-election wave of the survey,
were discussed previously in Chapter 3.
Tables 4.17{4.24 indicate that the eect of uncertainty on turnout is much more
consistent than that of registration requirements. Most likely, this is due to a rela-
tionship between voter mobilization and the registration deadline. In elections where
voters make their vote decisions early, the registration deadline would have a much
weaker eect than in elections where voters choose to vote for a particular candidate
in the last few weeks of the campaign. In the latter case, a state with a high registra-
tion deadline would be expected to experience lower turnout than a state with a low
registration deadline, as unregistered or improperly registered voters would be unable
to vote without having contacted the registrar before the state deadline. Thus, the
impact of election-specic voter mobilization timing may account for the inconsistent
inuence of the registration deadline shown in Tables 4.17{4.24.
Reducing uncertainty to the levels just described for all Presidential candidates
in the 1972{2000 elections would have increased turnout by between 5.0 percentage
points (note, that this is not statistically signicant) in 1984 and 12.2 percentage
points in 1980. In contrast, eliminating the registration deadline and instituting DMV
registration would have increased turnout by between -10.1 percentage points (not
statistically signicant) in 1980 and 15.5 percentage points in 1992. Across all eight
elections, the average expected increase in turnout due to reducing uncertainty would
be 9.2 percentage points, while that due to eliminating registration barriers would
be 6.0 percentage points. These results demonstrate that while reducing uncertainty
consistently increases turnout, reducing registration barriers is not so reliable.
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Table 4.17: Reduction of Barriers to Voting and Change in 1972 Turnout and Vote
Choice
Counterfactual Simulations
Abstention McGovern Vote Nixon Vote
Baseline Prediction 29.6** 24.7** 45.7**
(1.6) (1.4) (1.8)
Informational Barriers
Uncertainty about McGovern -6.0** +7.4** -1.4**
(1.7) (2.0) (0.7)
Uncertainty about Nixon -9.2** -1.3* +10.4**
(2.4) (0.8) (2.8)
Total Uncertainty -10.9** +3.4** +7.5**
(2.4) (1.0) (2.4)
Registration Requirements
Deadline -6.5 +8.1 -1.6
(12.5) (10.5) (13.3)
DMV -7.0 +8.6 -1.6
(6.5) (7.9) (8.0)
Deadline and DMV -13.0 +17.6 -4.6
(11.2) (15.1) (14.4)
Note: Simulations based on conditional
multinomial logit estimates in Table 4.1.
* indicates a =.10 level of statistical signicance, two-tailed test.
** indicates a =.05 level of statistical signicance, two-tailed test.
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Table 4.18: Reduction of Barriers to Voting and Change in 1976 Turnout and Vote
Choice
Counterfactual Simulations
Abstention Carter Vote Ford Vote
Baseline Prediction 28.3** 36.0** 35.7**
(1.2) (1.1) (1.2)
Informational Barriers
Uncertainty about Carter -4.3** +5.4** -1.2**
(1.3) (1.6) (0.4)
Uncertainty about Ford -3.5** -1.5** +5.0**
(1.1) (0.5) (1.4)
Total Uncertainty -6.2** +3.4** +2.9**
(1.6) (1.1) (0.8)
Registration Requirements
Deadline -9.7** +9.8** +0.1
(2.8) (3.6) (3.7)
DMV -1.3 +4.8* -3.5
(2.7) (2.9) (2.4)
Deadline and DMV -11.0** +14.9** -4.0
(3.5) (4.9) (4.4)
Note: Simulations based on conditional
multinomial logit estimates in Table 4.2.
* indicates a =.10 level of statistical signicance, two-tailed test.
** indicates a =.05 level of statistical signicance, two-tailed test.
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Table 4.19: Reduction of Barriers to Voting and Change in 1980 Turnout and Vote
Choice
Counterfactual Simulations
Abstention Carter Vote Anderson Vote Reagan Vote
Baseline Prediction 29.6** 27.3** 6.1** 36.9**
(1.3) (1.3) (0.7) (1.5)
Informational Barriers
Uncertainty about Carter -20.2** +24.8** +0.7 -5.3**
(3.1) (4.3) (0.5) (1.7)
uncertainty about Anderson -16.3** -7.5** +28.7** -4.9**
(5.1) (3.0) (9.7) (2.0)
Uncertainty about Reagan -20.5** -6.9** +2.7** +24.7**
(3.3) (2.0) (1.0) (4.4)
Total Uncertainty -12.1** +2.9 +3.0 +6.2**
(3.1) (2.9) (2.2) (3.0)
Registration Requirements
Deadline +8.6 -2.3 +0.9 -7.2
(14.4) (7.8) (4.5) (8.1)
DMV +1.1 +2.6 -4.7** +0.9
(7.9) (5.5) (0.9) (5.8)
Deadline and DMV +10.1 +0.4 -4.4** -6.1
(15.2) (8.9) (1.8) (9.0)
Note: Simulations based on conditional
multinomial logit estimates in Table 4.3.
* indicates a =.10 level of statistical signicance, two-tailed test.
** indicates a =.05 level of statistical signicance, two-tailed test.
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Table 4.20: Reduction of Barriers to Voting and Change in 1984 Turnout and Vote
Choice
Counterfactual Simulations
Abstention Mondale Vote Reagan Vote
Baseline Prediction 25.9** 31.0** 43.1**
(1.1) (1.2) (1.2)
Informational Barriers
Uncertainty about Mondale -6.9** +6.0** +0.9
(2.3) (2.9) (1.7)
Uncertainty about Reagan -7.5** -2.2 +9.7**
(3.1) (2.5) (4.8)
Total Uncertainty -5.0 -0.4 +5.4
(3.9) (3.2) (4.5)
Registration Requirements
Deadline -4.5 +19.0** -14.5**
(8.7) (7.8) (6.9)
DMV +7.3 +0.2 -7.5
(7.8) (4.6) (6.7)
Deadline and DMV +1.3 +18.6* -19.8**
(11.7) (10.0) (7.3)
Note: Simulations based on conditional
multinomial logit estimates in Table 4.4.
* indicates a =.10 level of statistical signicance, two-tailed test.
** indicates a =.05 level of statistical signicance, two-tailed test.
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Table 4.21: Reduction of Barriers to Voting and Change in 1988 Turnout and Vote
Choice
Counterfactual Simulations
Abstention Dukakis Vote Bush Vote
Baseline Prediction 31.6** 32.1** 36.3**
(1.2) (1.0) (1.3)
Informational Barriers
Uncertainty about Dukakis -8.6** +8.9** -0.3
(2.2) (2.5) (8.1)
Uncertainty about Bush -7.1** +0.5 +6.6**
(2.0) (1.4) (2.4)
Total Uncertainty -9.9** +6.3** +3.6**
(2.1) (2.1) (1.8)
Registration Requirements
Deadline -11.3* +5.3 +6.1
(5.9) (5.9) (4.8)
DMV +2.3 +2.1 -4.4*
(2.6) (2.4) (2.5)
Deadline and DMV -9.6 +8.2 +1.3
(6.0) (5.7) (4.9)
Note: Simulations based on conditional
multinomial logit estimates in Table 4.5.
* indicates a =.10 level of statistical signicance, two-tailed test.
** indicates a =.05 level of statistical signicance, two-tailed test.
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Table 4.22: Reduction of Barriers to Voting and Change in 1992 Turnout and Vote
Choice
Counterfactual Simulations
Abstention Clinton Vote Perot Vote Bush Vote
Baseline Prediction 25.0** 36.5** 13.2** 25.2**
(1.0) (1.1) (0.8) (1.0)
Informational Barriers
Uncertainty about Clinton -7.7** +5.5** +1.5* +0.7
(1.7) (1.9) (0.9) (0.8)
uncertainty about Perot -3.7** -0.3 +3.6** +0.4
(1.2) (0.4) (1.5) (0.4)
Uncertainty about Bush -6.6** -0.9 +2.3** +5.3**
(1.8) (0.9) (1.1) (2.6)
Total Uncertainty -7.8** +4.0** +2.4 +1.4
(1.8) (1.9) (1.6) (2.0)
Registration Requirements
Deadline -15.8** +6.6 +2.1 +7.1
(3.2) (6.6) (5.9) (6.5)
DMV +0.6 -1.0 +0.6 -0.2
(1.6) (1.7) (1.2) (1.5)
Deadline and DMV -15.5** +5.6 +2.9 +7.0
(3.4) (6.5) (6.2) (6.5)
Note: Simulations based on conditional
multinomial logit estimates in Table 4.6.
* indicates a =.10 level of statistical signicance, two-tailed test.
** indicates a =.05 level of statistical signicance, two-tailed test.
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Table 4.23: Reduction of Barriers to Voting and Change in 1996 Turnout and Vote
Choice
Counterfactual Simulations
Abstention Clinton Vote Perot Vote Dole Vote
Baseline Prediction 24.9** 40.6** 5.3** 29.2**
(1.2) (1.3) (0.6) (1.3)
Informational Barriers
Uncertainty about Clinton -9.2* +10.2 -1.1 +0.1
(4.9) (8.6) (1.2) (2.7)
uncertainty about Perot -1.0 -0.5 +1.3* +0.2
(1.6) (1.6) (0.7) (3.9)
Uncertainty about Dole -5.3* +0.2 -0.7 +5.8
(3.1) (4.0) (1.0) (7.6)
Total Uncertainty -10.8* +7.2 -1.4 +4.9
(5.9) (8.0) (2.5) (5.9)
Registration Requirements
Deadline -5.1 +6.3 +1.0 -2.2
(4.1) (4.8) (2.6) (3.2)
Note: Simulations based on conditional
multinomial logit estimates in Table 4.7.
* indicates a =.10 level of statistical signicance, two-tailed test.
** indicates a =.05 level of statistical signicance, two-tailed test.
Table 4.24: Reduction of Barriers to Voting and Change in 2000 Turnout and Vote
Choice
Counterfactual Simulations
Abstention Gore Vote Bush Vote
Baseline Prediction 25.7** 39.9** 34.4**
(1.3) (1.3) (1.3)
Informational Barriers
Uncertainty about Gore -8.5** +9.0 -0.4
(4.1) (6.5) (2.7)
Uncertainty about Bush -6.9* -0.5 +7.3
(3.7) (3.8) (7.2)
Total Uncertainty -10.7** +5.9 +4.8
(5.5) (5.7) (5.5)
Registration Requirements
Deadline -4.8 +2.8 +2.0
(3.9) (4.4) (3.8)
Note: Simulations based on conditional
multinomial logit estimates in Table 4.8.
* indicates a =.10 level of statistical signicance, two-tailed test.
** indicates a =.05 level of statistical signicance, two-tailed test.
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Unfortunately, the simulations presented in Tables 4.17{4.22 suer from the fact
that their meaning is somewhat unintuitive. It is not easy to comprehend the mean
level of uncertainty of all individuals who place a candidate on the ideology scale. Yet
for lack of a more familiar value, this is what I use in the 1972{1992 data. Fortunately,
for 1996 and 2000, there is a better option available in the form of the direct measure
of uncertainty.
Therefore, to measure the eects of more realistic changes in uncertainty I use the
direct measure, which is calibrated to the three stated levels: \very certain," \pretty
certain," and \not very certain." In Figure 4.5, I show the changes in turnout and the
percentage of eligible voters that vote for each candidate given this sort of decrease
in uncertainty. As the Bartels measure of uncertainty cannot be attached to such
intuitively comprehensible levels of uncertainty, I apply this exercise only to the 1996
and 2000 elections, which contain the direct uncertainty measure.
The left half of the gure shows the estimates for the 1996 election and the right
half of the table shows the estimates for the 2000 election. For each election, the
rst cluster of bars shows the aggregate changes that result when the uncertainty
of those that are \not very certain" decreases to the level of the \pretty certain"
response. Likewise, for each election the second cluster of bars shows the aggregate
changes that result when the uncertainty of those that are \not very certain" as
well as \pretty certain" decreases to the level of the \very certain" response.
5
It is
important to recognize that even when respondents say they are \very certain" they
may have a degree of residual uncertainty. Hence, these simulations do not completely
eliminate uncertainty. Rather, they minimize uncertainty to levels that (hopefully)
are attainable by public policies aimed at informing the electorate before an election.
The magnitude of the increase in turnout caused by these shifts is quite dramatic.
Increasing only the certainty of those who said they were \not very certain" to the
\pretty certain" level results in a 5.5 percentage point increase in turnout in 1996 and
a 6.9 percentage point increase in turnout in 2000 (note that all of the changes shown
5
To simulate these eects, I use the average uncertainty predicted by the reduced-form equations
for respondents giving the appropriate designated response.
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in the gure are statistically signicant). Increasing the certainty of both those who
said they were \not very certain" and those who said they were \pretty certain" to
the \very certain" response results in a 12.8 percentage point increase in turnout in
both 1996 and 2000. Given the relative consistency over the election years 1972{2000
of the eects of uncertainty on turnout, it is reasonable to expect that the eects of
the shifts shown in Figure 4.5 would also be fairly consistent over these years. Hence,
decreases in uncertainty may dramatically increase turnout in U.S. national elections.
It is also illuminating to consider the eects of changes in uncertainty and registra-
tion requirements on the percentage of the electorate that votes for each Presidential
candidate. As Tables 4.17{4.24 show, the impact of reducing uncertainty on the elec-
tion outcome varies from year to year. In ve of the elections it would have increased
the expected percentage of the electorate voting for the Democrat more than the
change in the expected percentage of the electorate voting for the Republican or the
expected percentage of the electorate voting for a third-party candidate. In three
of the elections, (1972, 1980, and 1984), the exact opposite would have occurred,
beneting the Republican candidate over the others.
Overall, this demonstrates that there is a great deal of variability in which Presi-
dential candidate benets from decreasing uncertainty. For example, of the six elec-
tions with running incumbents, in three the advantage falls to the incumbent, while
in the other three it falls to the major party challenger. In the two elections with no
incumbent, reducing uncertainty benets the Democratic candidate more than the
Republican candidate.
These results contradict those of Bartels (1996). From his analysis of the impact
of uncertainty on vote choice in U.S. Presidential elections (1972{1996) he concludes
that Democrats and incumbents benet most from an uninformed electorate. The
dierence between his results and those described here stems from the dierence
between his behavioral model and that advocated in Chapter 2. While Bartels ignores
abstention and analyzes only candidate choice among voters, I analyze candidate
choice and abstention simultaneously. Furthermore, while Bartels ignores the role of
political preferences (as measured by ideology and partisan identication) I include
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them in the model specication. As shown above, the results indicate that uncertainty
strongly inuences both turnout and vote choice.
The predicted eect on vote choice of eliminating registration requirement barriers
is much more consistent, and biased, than that of reducing uncertainty. In seven of
the eight elections (1972, 1976, 1980, 1984, 1988, 1996, and 2000) it increased the
percentage of the electorate voting for the Democratic candidate more than the change
for any other candidate competing for oÆce.
Hence, while reducing uncertainty seems to benet neither party systematically,
reforming registration laws seems to bestow an advantage upon Democrats rather
than Republicans. To study this more carefully, I calculate the change in the vote
share of each candidate in each election due to the reduction of uncertainty and the
elimination of registration barriers as simulated in Tables 4.17{4.24. The results of
these calculations are shown in Table 4.25. Comparing the changes in vote shares
in Table 4.25 to the actual vote shares shown in Table 3.1 indicates that two elec-
tion results (in terms of both the popular and electoral vote) actually would have
changed due to the elimination of the registration barriers: the 1972 election between
McGovern and Nixon, and the 1984 election between Mondale and Reagan (note,
that only the change in the 1984 election is statistically signicant). In contrast,
reducing uncertainty would not have changed the popular winner of any election {
however, given the closeness of the 2000 election, it most likely would have changed
the electoral college winner.
These results are actually quite surprising given the conclusions of Wolnger and
Rosenstone (1978, 1980) who analyze the eects of registration laws on turnout and
conclude that eliminating these barriers would moderately increase turnout but would
have no eect on the election outcome. In fact, Wolnger and Rosenstone consid-
ered \the partisan consequences of registration law reform to be trivial." (p. 85)
Yet Wolnger and Rosenstone's results arise from a binary model of the decision to
turnout or abstain that ignores political or partisan preferences and vote choice (in
fact, as discussed above, the CPS data that they use does not measure any of these
variables). Their conclusion regarding the eects of registration law reform is based
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on a secondary application of the coeÆcient estimates from their binary statistical
analysis on CPS data to NES data. In this way they simulate vote choice through
the partisan identication of those that would turnout under registration law reform.
Finding little dierence in the partisan identication of those who would turnout
with and without relaxed registration requirements, Wolnger and Rosenstone con-
clude that election results would not change.
What is ignored in this analysis is the important role of ideology and strength of
partisan attachment in determining both turnout and vote choice. Omitting these
variables from the model that predicts turnout suggests that we should expect strong
Republican identiers who greatly prefer the Republican candidate to have the same
rate of turnout and the same consistency of vote choice as independents who are
relatively indierent. This demonstrates that the strengths of the model of voting
behavior described in Chapter 2 and analyzed in Chapter 4 are two-fold. Firstly,
it is a model of the vote decision-making process that incorporates the simultaneous
nature of the choice between turnout and abstention as well as among the candidates
competing for election. Secondly, it may be used to accurately predict aggregate
turnout and the vote share earned by each candidate. Thus, it leads to reliable
conclusions about the eects of changes in citizens' information and institutional
requirements on turnout and the election outcome.
The inuence of uncertainty about the candidates diers from that of registration
requirements in that it does not consistently benet the candidate of one major party
to the detriment of that of the other major party. That this is true is shown by the
results in Tables 4.17{4.24, which demonstrate that reducing uncertainty would have
increased the percentage of people voting for candidates of both parties across the
eight elections studied. The reason for the dierence in these eects is most likely
due to the persuasive nature of political information. Reducing uncertainty may
well induce voters to vote for a candidate whom they otherwise would not prefer as
they learn more about the political stands of that candidate. In contrast, reducing
institutional barriers to voting is likely to increase turnout among those who face high
costs of voting (those with low socioeconomic status) who, as DeNardo (1980) and
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Radcli (1994) have shown, are more likely to identify with Democratic candidates.
This indicates that it may be easier to increase turnout by implementing policies
that aim to decrease uncertainty rather than policies that aim to decrease registration
barriers. Not only is the impact of uncertainty on turnout sizeable, it is also less biased
in terms of its partisan eect than the impact of registration barriers. As shown by
the debate surrounding the NVRA, partisan incentives can make voter registration
reform quite diÆcult to implement. In 1993 the NVRA passed Congress along a fairly
standard party-line vote.
6
In 1994 California Governor Pete Wilson (a Republican)
initiated a federal law suit in a failed attempt to avoid implementing the law. More
recently, in 2001 Arizona Congressman Bob Stump (a Republican) introduced a bill
into the House of Representatives to repeal the NVRA. Clearly, Republicans have
incentives to quash registration reform while Democrats have incentives to push for
registration reform.
Given the controversy and diÆculty of formulating policies that increase turnout,
it is natural to wonder if such eorts are worthwhile. The results of this analysis show
that increasing turnout would have changed the outcomes of at least one of the past
eight elections. Moreover, increasing turnout by reducing uncertainty necessitates
expanding the electorate's amount of political information. In this way, politicians
and candidates may be held more accountable to their campaign promises and the
decisions they make while in oÆce.
6
The NVRA was passed by the House of Representatives on a 259 to 164 vote: 238 Democrats
and 20 Republicans voting yes and 14 Democrats and 150 Republicans voting no. It was then passed
by the Senate on a 62 to 36 vote: 56 Democrats and 6 Republicans voting yes and 36 Republicans
voting no.
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Table 4.25: Reduction of Barriers to Voting and Change in Candidate Vote Shares
Counterfactual Simulations
Election Year Reduction of Reduction of
and Candidate Uncertainty Registration Barriers
1972
McGovern -0.6 (1.3) +15.6 (15.2)
Nixon +0.6 (1.3) -15.6 (15.2)
1976
Carter +0.3 (0.6) +11.4** (5.2)
Ford -0.3 (0.6) -11.4** (5.2)
1980
Carter -2.2 (3.1) +7.2 (8.1)
Anderson +2.4 (2.7) -5.9** (2.6)
Reagan -0.1 (2.9) -1.3 (8.2)
1984
Mondale -3.2 (4.3) +26.2** (9.0)
Reagan +3.2 (4.3) -26.2** (9.0)
1988
Dukakis +2.1 (2.1) +4.8 (5.7)
Bush -2.1 (2.1) -4.8 (5.7)
1992
Clinton +0.2 (2.1) -2.1 (6.9)
Perot +1.2 (2.0) +0.2 (6.8)
Bush -1.4 (2.2) +1.9 (7.0)
1996
Clinton +1.6 (7.4) +4.4 (4.8)
Perot -2.5 (3.1) +0.8 (3.2)
Dole +0.8 (6.7) -5.2 (3.9)
2000
Gore +0.2 (5.8) +0.3 (4.5)
Bush -0.2 (5.8) -0.3 (4.5)
Note: Simulations based on conditional multinomial
logit estimates in Tables 4.1 - 4.8.
* indicates a =.10 level of statistical signicance
** indicates a =.05 level of statistical signicance,
two tailed tests.
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Chapter 5 Composition of the Electorate
An important aspect of the democratic process is the nature of the people that make
up the voting public. As described earlier, elected politicians face obvious incentives
to enact policies that increase their chances of being reelected to public oÆce. This
entails supporting and promoting legislation that satises the political demands of
a majority of their electorate. Groups of citizens that do not vote or do not often
vote are for this reason not included in the set that politicians care about. Thus, the
eects of changes in uncertainty and the voter registration system on the composition
of the voting population are an important means by which to evaluate their usefulness.
Accordingly, in this chapter I change the focus of my analysis to study not simply
aggregate turnout, but turnout among dierent segments of the American electorate.
Wolnger and Rosenstone (1978, 1980), as discussed in Chapter 4, found that
increasing turnout by registration law reform would have very little eect on election
outcomes. The reason for this, they argued, is \although making it easier for people to
register would increase turnout, it would have a very small impact on the demographic
characteristics of voters." (1980, p. 83) In this way, aggregated political preferences
and election results would also remain relatively unchanged.
Somewhat surprisingly, Wolnger and Rosenstone also showed that, \the most
striking variations in the eects of registration reform would be among people at
dierent levels of education. Liberalizing registration provisions would have by far
the greatest impact on the least educated and relatively little eect on well-educated
people." (1980, p. 79) They estimated that turnout would increase by 13.2 percentage
points among people with fewer than ve years of school and only 2.8 percentage
points among people with postgraduate schooling, thus suggesting that registration
reform could broaden the voting population in some respects.
Yet even this modest result was subsequently revealed to be incorrect. Nagler
(1991) demonstrated that the normal cumulative distribution function (cdf) in the
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binary probit model imposes a restrictive relationship between the independent and
dependent variables. An often unrecognized aspect of this relationship is the pos-
sible presence of interactions between the independent variables that inuence the
dependent variable probabilities. Education, as a costs of voting measure, is strongly
predictive of turnout. Individuals with low education in the CPS data collection have
a nearly .5 predicted probability of turnout. As .5 is at the steepest part of the cumu-
lative normal distribution function, any uniform decrease in the cost of voting (such
as due to registration law reform) would have a disproportionately large eect on
the estimated probability of such individuals turning out to vote. By controlling for
these interactions, Nagler (1991) concludes that registration reform does not increase
turnout more among those with less education.
The conditional multinomial logit used in this analysis is unlikely to be plagued by
interactions as severe as those encountered by Wolnger and Rosenstone. The reason
for this is that the individual probabilities are distributed dierently with the joint
logistic distribution function. Nonetheless, to be sure that potential interactions do
not generate misleading conclusions, I incorporate interactions like those suggested
by Nagler into the models used to produce the results presented below. These inter-
actions are between the variables of interest: the barriers to turnout (uncertainty and
the registration deadline) that are manipulated and the demographic features that
describe important aspects of the eligible electorate.
The two elections analyzed in this chapter are the 1972 and 2000 elections. These
are the earliest and the most recent in the series I analyze and as such allow a wide
comparison of the inuences on turnout across years. I do not elect to run this model
on all eight elections because given the extensive analysis in the last chapter the trends
in the impact of these variables on turnout over the years has been established. For
both 1972 and 2000 I include interactions that allow me to accurately analyze the
eects of changes in uncertainty and the registration deadline on turnout broken down
by individuals' income and racial status.
These variables are of particular interest given that they have been shown (Verba,
Schlozman and Brady (1995)) to have a strong impact upon political preferences and
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vote choice. Nonetheless, race in of itself, has no theorized relationship with the vote
decision that is not captured by the variables already included in the model. However,
as race is most likely correlated with these variables, it is included in the interaction
specications. By doing this, I hope to show how policies may eect the composition
of the electorate using counterfactual simulations.
As in the last chapter, the rst-stage estimates that predict uncertainty about
each candidate are presented in Tables A.9{A.10 in the appendix. Generally, they
provide support for the theory that uncertainty is caused by individual costs of infor-
mation which are correlated with education, income and news exposure. They also
provide evidence that the relationship between uncertainty and the vote decision is
endogenous, as they indicate that voters in the elections analyzed engage in selective
information processing. The second-stage estimates are presented here in Tables 5.1{
5.2. For both elections they are fairly similar to the results shown in Tables 4.1{4.8
in the last chapter. The partisan identication and ideological categorization vari-
ables support the theorized role of ideological proximity, the costs of voting variables
indicate that respondents are less likely to turnout the higher their costs and the
candidate uncertainty measures have a strong, negative eect on turnout and vote
choice.
The coeÆcients on the interaction terms are somewhat more diÆcult to interpret.
As shown by Nagler (1991), they control the correlations between variables and the
nonlinear cumulative distribution function. Hence, their impact is fairly indecipher-
able from the tables of estimates shown. For 1972, the only statistically signicant
estimates belong to the non-white interactions. The registration deadline interactions
are diering signs for each candidate, whereas the uncertainty interactions are both
positive. Nonetheless, the actual eects on turnout are unclear and will only be re-
solved by rst dierences or counterfactual simulations. For 2000, the interactions
between uncertainty and income levels of $25,000{$50,000 and $50,000{$75,000 for
the Republican candidate are negative and statistically signicant. The interactions
between the registration deadline and an income level of $50,000{$75,000 for the
Democratic candidate, and non-white for the Republican candidate, are positive and
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negative, respectively, as well as statistically signicant.
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Table 5.1: 1972 Vote Decision
Conditional Multinomial Logit Results
Variable Choice Specic McGovern Vote Nixon Vote
Candidate Uncertainty -0.54** (0.25)
Constant -2.12** (0.81) -1.84** (0.87)
Ideology 0.72** (0.25) -0.09 (0.25)
Weak Partisan I.D. 0.69** (0.16) -0.34** (0.14)
Strong Partisan I.D. 1.39** (0.19) -0.77** (0.18)
Age 2.03** (0.60) 3.35** (0.52)
Education
HS Degree 0.57** (0.22) 0.42** (0.18)
Some College 0.54** (0.22) 0.26 (0.25)
BA Degree 0.66 (0.42) 0.25 (0.38)
Family Income
$5K-$9K 0.15 (0.73) 0.06 (0.60)
$9K-$15K 1.19 (0.82) 0.75 (0.67)
$15K+ 0.24 (1.11) 1.05 (1.01)
DMV Registration 0.78 (0.50) 0.33 (0.52)
Registration Deadline -0.04 (0.04) -0.03 (0.04)
Sqrt Registration Deadline 0.06 (0.26) -0.10 (0.29)
Registration Deadline
Interactions
(Reg. Dead.)*($5K-$9K) 0.01 (0.03) 0.02 (0.02)
(Reg. Dead.)*($9K-$15K) -0.03 (0.03) 0.01 (0.02)
(Reg. Dead.)*($15K+) 0.02 (0.04) 0.02 (0.03)
(Reg. Dead.)*(nonwhite) 0.03** (0.01) -0.03** (0.01)
Candidate Uncertainty
(Uncertainty)*($5K-$9K) 0.05 (0.22) 0.07 (0.20)
(Uncertainty)*($9K-$15K) -0.08 (0.21) 0.05 (0.20)
(Uncertainty)*($15K+) 0.11 (0.24) 0.22 (0.23)
(Uncertainty)*(nonwhite) 0.28** (0.14) 0.33* (0.17)
log-likelihood -1583.4
observations 2015
Note: (Abstention coeÆcients normalized to zero).
Entries are maximum likelihood estimates
with associated standard errors in parenthesis.
* indicates a =.10 level of statistical signicance, two tailed test.
** indicates a =.05 level of statistical signicance, two tailed test.
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Table 5.2: 2000 Vote Decision
2000 Conditional Multinomial Logit Results
Variable Choice Specic Gore Vote Bush Vote
Candidate Uncertainty -1.44** (0.67)
Constant -3.41** (1.02) -4.09** (1.22)
Ideology 0.47** (0.13) -0.49** (0.15)
Weak Partisan I.D. 1.22** (0.26) -0.57** (0.25)
Strong Partisan I.D. 1.56** (0.28) -0.86** (0.37)
Age 2.48** (0.74) 2.87** (0.91)
Education
HS Degree 0.27 (0.37) -0.53 (0.57)
Some College 0.35 (0.41) -0.85 (0.68)
BA Degree 1.15** (0.49) -1.27 (0.78)
Family Income
$25K-$50K -0.04 (1.34) -3.05* (1.73)
$50K-$75K -1.06 (1.39) -1.91 (1.90)
$75K+ -0.97 (1.51) -1.73 (1.83)
TV News -0.38 (0.31) -1.22** (0.36)
Newspaper 0.36 (0.25) 0.34 (0.25)
TV Campaign Programs 0.19 (0.31) 0.09 (0.36)
Registration Deadline -0.03 (0.06) 0.03 (0.06)
Sqrt Registration Deadline -0.46 (0.31) -0.23 (0.33)
Registration Deadline
Interactions
(Reg. Dead.)*($25K-$50K) 0.02 (0.04) 0.03 (0.04)
(Reg. Dead.)*($50K-$75K) 0.07* (0.04) -0.01 (0.05)
(Reg. Dead.)*($75K+) 0.04 (0.04) 0.02 (0.04)
(Reg. Dead.)*(nonwhite) 0.03 (0.02) -0.06** (0.03)
Candidate Uncertainty
(Uncertainty)*($25K-$50K) 0.11 (0.64) -1.18* (0.62)
(Uncertainty)*($50K-$75K) -0.17 (0.61) -1.16* (0.63)
(Uncertainty)*($75K+) -0.09 (0.63) -0.87 (0.68)
(Uncertainty)*(nonwhite) 0.23 (0.35) -0.16 (0.28)
log-likelihood -779.6
observations 1250
Note: (Abstention coeÆcients normalized to zero).
Entries are maximum likelihood estimates
with associated standard errors in parenthesis.
* indicates a =.10 level of statistical signicance, two tailed test.
** indicates a =.05 level of statistical signicance, two tailed test.
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5.1 Counterfactual Simulations
The results of the counterfactual simulations based on the analysis shown in Ta-
bles 5.1{5.2 are shown below in Tables 5.3{5.4. Each table demonstrates the pre-
dicted aggregate change in the percent of the population that abstains, votes for one
candidate or votes for the other candidate. To evaluate the composition of the voting
population, these changes are broken down by race and family income.
For both years, reducing uncertainty has a more powerful impact on the compo-
sition of the voting population than eliminating the registration deadline. In 1972 it
would have increased turnout among those in the lowest quartile of family income by
14.2 percentage points more than the increase in turnout among those in the highest
income quartile. In 2000, it would have increased turnout among those in the lowest
quartile by 10.1 percentage points more than the increase in turnout among those in
the highest income quartile. The changes broken down by race are not as dramatic;
in 1972 reducing uncertainty would have increased turnout among non-whites by 7.1
percentage points and among whites by 8.6 percentage points, while in 2000 it would
have increased turnout among non-whites by 8.6 percentage points and among whites
by 7.9 percentage points. As shown in the table, these changes are not statistically
signicantly dierent from one another.
The eect of registration law reform is not as consistent. In 1972, eliminating reg-
istration deadlines would have increased turnout most among those with low-income.
The expected increase in turnout among those in the lowest quartile of family income
would have been 9.2 percentage points more than that of those in the highest income
quartile. However, these changes are not statistically signicant. In 2000, eliminating
registration deadlines would have increased turnout by 14.8 percentage points among
individuals in the lowest income quartile and would have had no statistically signif-
icant eect on all others. The expected dierence between those in the lowest and
highest income quartiles in 2000 is 14.0 percentage points. Broken down by race, the
eects in both years are quite weak, and not statistically signicant.
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Table 5.3: Reduction of Barriers to Voting and Change in 1972 Turnout and Vote
Choice by Income and Race
Counterfactual Simulations
Abstention McGovern Vote Nixon Vote
Baseline Prediction 29.6** (1.1) 24.7** (1.0) 45.7** (1.3)
Uncertainty
Family Income
$5K or less -15.6** (4.5) +5.4** (1.8) +10.3** (3.1)
$5K-$9K -10.6** (2.2) +3.8** (1.8) +6.8** (2.2)
$9-$15K -5.8** (1.3) +2.4** (0.9) +3.4** (1.4)
$15K+ -1.4 (1.0) +0.8 (0.8) +0.6 (1.1)
Race
White -8.6** (3.2) +2.8 (3.0) +5.8** (2.3)
Nonwhite -7.1** (1.5) +6.0** (0.8) +1.1 (1.4)
Registration Deadline
Family Income
$5K or less -9.8 (10.9) +1.4 (8.0) +8.3 (11.2)
$5K-$9K -2.8 (10.9) +3.1 (8.2) -0.3 (9.6)
$9-$15K -10.1 (8.3) +17.1* (9.8) -7.0 (10.1)
$15K+ -0.6 (10.9) -1.1 (8.4) +1.7 (11.6)
Race
White -6.7 (11.0) +8.2 (8.9) -1.6 (8.6)
Nonwhite -3.6 (8.1) -10.3 (6.7) +13.9 (8.9)
Note: Simulations based on conditional
multinomial logit estimates in Table 5.1 .
* indicates a =.10 level of statistical signicance, two tailed test.
** indicates a =.05 level of statistical signicance, two tailed test.
88
Table 5.4: Reduction of Barriers to Voting and Change in 2000 Turnout and Vote
Choice by Income and Race
Counterfactual Simulations
Abstention Gore Vote Bush Vote
Baseline Prediction 25.7** (1.3) 39.9** (1.3) 34.4** (1.3)
Uncertainty
Family Income
$25K or less -12.7** (5.6) +4.8 (4.1) +7.9** (3.7)
$25K-$50K -9.3** (3.9) +1.6 (5.5) +7.7 (5.6)
$50-$75K -6.6** (2.7) +0.7 (6.3) +5.9 (6.4)
$75K+ -2.6 (2.9) +0.9 (5.2) +1.8 (6.3)
Race
White -7.9** (2.6) +1.4 (4.3) +6.5 (4.8)
Nonwhite -8.6* (4.6) +4.9 (6.0) +3.7 (3.6)
Registration Deadline
Family Income
$25K or less -14.8* (8.8) +12.6 (8.9) +2.2 (7.4)
$25K-$50K -3.8 (6.3) +8.9 (5.8) -5.1 (4.6)
$50-$75K -1.1 (6.5) -10.5 (7.2) +11.6 (7.6)
$75K+ -0.8 (4.9) +2.9 (6.5) -2.1 (6.0)
Race
White -4.9 (3.8) +7.3* (4.2) -2.4 (3.5)
Nonwhite -7.6 (7.0) -8.3 (8.3) +15.9** (7.7)
Note: Simulations based on conditional
multinomial logit estimates in Table 5.2 .
* indicates a =.10 level of statistical signicance, two tailed test.
** indicates a =.05 level of statistical signicance, two tailed test.
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Hence, while the results regarding uncertainty are consistent and easily inter-
pretable, the results regarding registration reform are somewhat weaker and more
complex. In all, they indicate that reducing institutional barriers is likely to increase
turnout among those with less income more than among those with more income.
However, the consistency and the magnitude of this dierence is unlikely to be as
great as that caused by reductions in uncertainty. This fact is demonstrated more
clearly in Figures 5.1{5.2, which show turnout and the changes in turnout due to
reducing informational and institutional barriers for 1972 and 2000.
In each of the two gures the solid line shows the baseline rate of turnout, the bro-
ken line shows the predicted rate of turnout if registration barriers were eliminated,
and the dotted line shows the rate of turnout if uncertainty were reduced.
1
Reducing
uncertainty raises turnout among those with low income much more strongly than
among those with high income. In contrast, the eects of eliminating the registra-
tion deadline are much less dramatic. However, in both years the increase is fairly
substantial among those with low income.
This conicts with the conclusions of both Nagler (1991) and Wolnger and Rosen-
stone (1980). Although both sets of researchers analyzed 1972 data, the predictions
here are clear in that they show registration reform would be expected both to in-
crease turnout among individuals with low income as well as to benet the Democratic
Presidential candidate. One dierence between these studies is the choice of election
data. The results presented here most denitely benet from my focus on multiple
elections rather than simply one election in that general trends are more easily no-
ticeable. Yet the more important dierence is in the model of the vote decision on
which the analysis is based. Recognizing the simultaneous choice between abstention
and voting for one or another candidate enables the results presented here to be both
1
For 1972 this is accomplished by replacing the uncertainty of those who do not place the can-
didate on the ideology scale and have a predicted level of uncertainty less than the average of those
who do place the candidates on the ideology scale, with the average predicted level of uncertainty
of those who place the candidate on the ideology scale. For 2000, this is accomplished by replacing
the uncertainty of those who report being \not very certain" about a candidate and have a pre-
dicted level of uncertainty less than the average of those who report being \pretty certain" or \very
certain," with the average predicted level of uncertainty of those who are \pretty certain" or \very
certain."
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more realistic and more accurate than those of the simple binary model used by Na-
gler (1991) and Wolnger and Rosenstone (1980) that ignores the role of candidate
choice.
As in Chapter 4, I attempt a more intuitive simulation using the direct uncertainty
measure. Figure 5.3 thus shows the change in turnout by income in 2000 due not
only to eliminating the registration deadline (the dotted line), and shifting those
respondents who are \not very certain" to \pretty certain" (the broken, dotted line),
and both those respondents who are \not very certain" and \pretty certain" to \very
certain" (the broken line), but also to completely eliminating uncertainty (the solid
line). This is done by shifting all respondents to the uncertainty level of the least
uncertain respondent. While unrealistic, this exercise demonstrates the powerful
impact of uncertainty.
As Figure 5.3 makes obvious, all of the reductions in uncertainty lead to sizeable
increases in expected turnout, with the shift of the \not very certain" to \pretty
certain" being the slightest and the complete elimination of uncertainty being the
greatest. Moreover, each shift in uncertainty increases the representativeness of the
voting population more than the reform of registration requirements. Although the
change due to eliminating the registration deadline is obviously greater for those
with low income than those with high income, it is nevertheless relatively at when
compared with the changes due to reducing uncertainty.
In sum, while registration law reform can be expected to increase voting among
those who are traditionally least likely to turnout, the benets of lowering uncertainty
appear to be of greater magnitude. The results of this chapter demonstrate that re-
ducing uncertainty may both substantially increase the overall rate of turnout in U.S.
elections as well as lead to a voting population that more adequately represents the
political preferences of the general population. Although policies that can accomplish
this are less obvious than policies that can reduce institutional barriers to turnout,
the potential rewards are such that it seems worthwhile to explore means of increasing
the electorate's level of political information.
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Figure 5.1: The Eects of Uncertainty on 1972 Turnout by Income
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Figure 5.2: The Eects of Uncertainty on 2000 Turnout by Income
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Figure 5.3: Change in 2000 Turnout Due to Reductions in Barriers by Income
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Chapter 6 Conclusion
The results of this analysis demonstrate that both information and institutions strongly
inuence the individual's decision to turnout and vote. In U.S. Presidential elections
between 1972 and 2000, reducing the electorate's uncertainty about the candidates
would have increased the rate of turnout by an average of 9.2 percentage points. Elim-
inating registration deadlines and instituting DMV registration would have increased
turnout in the same elections by a lower average of 6.0 percentage points.
Although it is not intuitively surprising that uncertainty about each candidate
reduces turnout, it is a fact that has not previously been tested scientically and
proven to be true. Alvarez (1997) and Bartels (1986) showed by rigorous analysis
that uncertainty about a candidate decreases the likelihood that voters will vote for
that particular candidate. Palfrey and Poole (1987) showed by using a composite
information index that individuals are more likely to turnout the higher their general
level of information. Formal research involving candidate competition, however, has
shown that candidates may be ambiguous only if voters have a risk-seeking vote utility
function.
The analysis I have presented in this study connects these empirical results by
demonstrating the powerful impact of candidate-specic information. Not only does
uncertainty about a candidate decrease the individual's likelihood of turning out to
vote, it also decreases her likelihood of voting for the candidate for whom she is
uncertain relative to her likelihood of voting for an opposing candidate. Further-
more, it shows that uncertainty detracts from voting and thus that voters are most
certainly not risk-seeking. Although imperfect information and costs of voting in-
dicate that candidates need not purposefully be ambiguous to generate uncertainty,
these results together with those of Franklin (1991) regarding the role of candidate
campaign decisions in determining uncertainty suggest that candidate strategy and
citizen uncertainty are worthy of future empirical and formal research.
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One aspect of citizen uncertainty shown here that indicates its signicance is the
bias it generates in turnout across individuals of dierent social and economic sta-
tus. The results detailed in Chapter 5 demonstrate that reducing uncertainty causes
turnout among those with less income to increase. This is of particular importance
because such individuals are traditionally unlikely to vote. For this reason, politi-
cians face few incentives to enact legislation that benets non-whites and low-income
citizens. By reducing uncertainty, the voting population may be more representative
of the general population, and therefore such inequalities in policy-making may be
vanquished.
The results in Chapter 5 also show that registration law reform may increase
turnout among those with less income, albeit not as dramatically as the increase due
to reducing uncertainty. This contradicts the well-established conclusions of Nagler
(1991) and Wolnger and Rosenstone (1980), who show that registration law reform
would have little eect upon the make up of the electorate. Although my analysis
benets from its use of eight elections rather than just one election (like Nagler (1991)
and Wolnger and Rosenstone (1980)), the most likely reason for this dierence is in
the assumptions about the model of the individual's vote decision. Nagler (1991) and
Wolnger and Rosenstone (1980) assume the decision is binary (to vote or abstain) {
ignoring the role of candidate choice. The analysis I present in this study incorporates
the simultaneous decision to vote for one or another candidate as well as to turnout
or abstain. In this way, I obtain accurate estimates of the inuence of registration
requirements on turnout and abstention.
Moreover, I am able to precisely estimate the eects of such changes on the election
outcome. Because Wolnger and Rosenstone (1980) used a binary model of turnout,
their estimates of the election outcome rely on a rather adhoc secondary analysis. I
nd that registration law reform would have been expected to benet the Democratic
candidate in seven of the eight elections analyzed and the Republican candidate in
only one of the elections analyzed. More importantly, I nd that this reform would
have been expected to change the outcome of one election (that in 1984) in favor
of the Democratic candidate, Walter Mondale. Again, this diers from Wolnger
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and Rosenstone (1980), who found that election outcomes should not be expected to
change.
However, I demonstrate that the stylized fact that higher turnout always benets
Democrats (as shown by DeNardo(1980) and Radcli (1994)) is incorrect. Rather, it
seems that the means by which turnout is increased relates strongly to its eect on the
election outcome. Reducing uncertainty about the candidates increases turnout but
benets dierent candidates by election. In four elections it advantaged the Democrat,
in two elections it advantaged the Republican and in two elections it advantaged the
third-party candidate.
Most likely, the reason for this dierence lies in the persuasive nature of informa-
tion versus registration institutions. Gaining information about a candidate (thereby
reducing uncertainty) may well cause an individual to vote for that candidate when
previously she would have preferred another. In contrast, lowering registration barri-
ers may prompt low income individuals to turnout while not inuencing their political
preferences. As the Democratic party traditionally appeals to such individuals, reg-
istration law reform is likely to benet Democratic candidates.
These results indicate that policy makers who hope to increase turnout among
minorities and those with less income may prefer policies that reduce uncertainty to
those that reduce registration barriers. Not only would policies reducing uncertainty
promote a well-informed citizenry, they have the potential to increase turnout much
more than policies that reform institutions. Furthermore, because such policies are
unlikely to systematically benet one party at the expense of the other, they may
be expected to encounter much more bipartisan support than those that reduce the
registration deadline.
Yet while these results show the potential eects on turnout and the election
outcome of decreasing uncertainty and registration deadlines, this analysis makes no
eort to measure the eÆciency of such decreases. This is not the goal of this study,
which aims only to show the relative inuence of these factors on turnout. Based
on this, future research may delve further into the costs and benets of policies that
increase the availability of political information, institute DMV registration or reduce
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the length of state registration deadlines.
The magnitude of the impact of uncertainty on turnout shown by these results
makes research on ways to reduce uncertainty potentially very rewarding. One of
the most important aspects of such analysis entails gauging the size of the decrease
in uncertainty caused by exposure to dierent sorts of information sources as well
as the costs of making such sources widely available. One pertinent issue to resolve
is the strength of the impact of relatively objective sources such as local news and
media, candidate statements published by the local registrar of voters and bipartisan
awareness activists (like Project Vote Smart), against that of relatively non-objective
sources such as party and candidate campaign advertisements and statements as well
as public endorsements by prominent individuals or interest groups.
Research into the eÆciency of reducing the registration deadline is also potentially
quite rewarding. This study would be made easier by the fact that many states
already operate under a variety of registration deadlines (for example North Dakota
allows voters to register on election day.) In January, 2001, the state of California
reduced its registration deadline from 29 to 15 days before an election. Although
this eases registration restrictions, it creates other problems including confusion at
polling places because the names of some late registrants do not appear on the voter
rosters and potential confusion among late registrants because they are not sent voter
pamphlets or sample ballots.
1
This indicates that all of the eects of policies aimed at increasing turnout should
be carefully considered and evaluated. The magnitude of the eects on turnout of
uncertainty and registration laws shown by the results of this analysis indicate that
pursuing reductions in these factors may be quite rewarding. Not only would reducing
uncertainty and registration deadlines increase turnout among the electorate, it would
expand the voting population so as to make it more representative of the general
population. In this way, increasing political information and knowledge of political
candidates would serve to make elected oÆcials more accountable to American citizens
for the decisions they make in public oÆce.
1
This is discussed in Rabin (2001).
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Appendix A Appendix
A.1 Chapter 2, Proofs
A.1.1 Assumptions
Let S denote the set of all candidates. Then, 8j 2 S, the eligible voter's utility is
given by
u
ij
= 
j
p
ij
  
2
ij
  c
i
u
i;
= 0
where ; ;  > 0 and
p
ij
= ideological proximity of individual i to candidate j

ij
= individual i's uncertainty about candidate j
c
i
= cost of voting for individual i
and the vote decision is given by
1
v
i
= argmax
j2S;;
u
ij
:
There exists a continuum of eligible voters whose characteristics are distributed
as follows.
1
For simplicity I ignore any ties in voter utility. With a continuum of voters and nite set S this
restriction is without loss of generality.
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8j 2 S; p
ij
 F
1j
( 1; 0)
8j 2 S; 
2
ij
 F
2j
(0;1)
c
i
 F
3
( 1;1)
where all F 's are cumulative distribution functions (cdf's) and have full support.
F
3
is independent of F
1j
for all j.
In what follows I represent the vector of individual uncertainty about candidate
j with 
2
j
, the vector of individual uncertainty for all candidates with 
2
, and the
vector of individual costs of voting with c.
A.1.2 Denitions
Electorate Uncertainty: Let the electorate's uncertainty about candidate j be 
2
j
.
The level of uncertainty 
02
j
represents a decrease in the electorate's uncertainty if
there exists a  < 1 such that 8i, 
02
ij
  
2
ij
.
Cost of Voting: Let the cost of voting by the electorate be c. The cost vector c
0
represents a decrease in costs if there exists a  < 1 such that 8i; c
0
i
  c
i
.
A.1.3 Proof
There exists a cdf G
j
for all j such that u
ij
 G
j
( 1;1) with full support. Dene
T
j
= fij argmax
l2S
u
il
= jg where T
j
is the set of eligible voters for whom candidate
j is the most preferred. Therefore, there exists a
^
G
j
for all j such that fu
ij
ji 2 T
j
g 
^
G
j
( 1;1) with full support, and V S
j
=
R
1
0
g^
j
(x) dx = 1 
^
G
j
(0) is the vote share
for candidate j and g^
j
is the pdf corresponding to
^
G
j
.
Hypothesis 1:
Suppose the electorate's uncertainty about candidate j reduces to 
02
j
. As
@u
ij
@
2
ij
=
  < 0, there exists a cdf
^
G
0
j
such that

u
0
ij
ji 2 T
j
(
2
)
	

^
G
0
j
( 1;1) with full
support such that
^
G
0
j
(x) <
^
G
j
(x) for all x 2 <. Therefore, turnout must increase
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within the group of eligible voters that most preferred candidate j before the change
in uncertainty. As
@u
il
@
2
ij
= 0 for all l 6= j, turnout in all T
l
must not decrease. Finally,
as this derivation is independent of 
 i
, the hypothesis must be true.
Hypothesis 2:
Suppose again that uncertainty about candidate j decreases to 
02
j
. As
@u
ij
@
2
ij
< 0
and
@u
il
@
2
ij
= 0 if l 6= j, i 2 T
j
(
2
) ) i 2 T
j
 

02
j

; and for l; m 6= j, i 2 T
l
(
2
) ) i =2
T
m
 

02
j

. Therefore, by Hypothesis 1, V S
j
(
02
) > V S
j
(
2
) and V S
l
(
02
)  V S
l
(
2
)
if l 6= j.
Hypothesis 3:
Suppose costs in the electorate decrease to c
0
. As
@u
ij
@c
i
=   < 0 for all i; j; it must
be that V
i
(c) 6= ; ) V
i
(c
0
) 6= ;. Further, for each j; there exists a cdf
^
G
0
j
satisfying
fu
ij
ji 2 T
j
(c)g 
^
G
0
j
( 1;1) with full support, such that
^
G
0
j
(x) <
^
G
j
(x) for all
x 2 <. Consequently, turnout in T
j
(c) must increase and, thus, turnout in the entire
electorate must increase.
108
A.2 Chapter 3, First-Stage Estimates
The estimates shown in Tables A.1{A.6 predict uncertainty about the candidates
with binary logit models. The dependent variable in these models is coded a 1 if
the respondent does not place the candidate on the ideology scale and a 0 if the
respondent does place the candidate on the ideology scale. In this way, the models
are able to predict the Bartels measure of individual uncertainty. The models shown
in Tables A.7{A.8 dier from those just discussed in that they predict uncertainty
about the candidates with ordered logit models. The dependent variable for these
years codes the response to the direct question regarding certainty about candidate
placement with a 3 for \not very certain," a 2 for \pretty certain," and a 1 for \very
certain."
As the reduced-form of the system of Equations (3.1) shown in Section 3.2, these
models contain the same set of variables that inuence the vote decision: direction and
strength of partisan attachment, ideological categorization, education, family income,
age, the registration deadline, whether or not the state has DMV registration as well
as newspaper, television news and television campaign coverage attention. The one
dierence in coding pertains to the variables measuring ideological categorization and
strength and direction of partisan attachment. Rather than use the scales employed
in the nal model I elect here to create indicator variables that denote with a 1 or a
0 whether or not one is a weak Democrat, a strong Democrat, a weak Republican, a
strong Republican, a liberal, or a conservative. I do this so as to accurately measure
the combined eects of party tactics and strategic information gathering on citizen
uncertainty.
I include a couple of variables that do not appear in the vote decision model. One
of these is an indicator variable denoting whether or not the individual watched any
or all of the televised Presidential candidate debates. This variable does not appear
in the NES data collections for the years 1972, 1988 and 1992. Hence, it does not
appear in my analysis of those years. For the years that it does appear it is coded
a 1 (meaning the respondent watched a debate) for between 68.6% and 83.9% of the
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survey sample. It is included in the model of uncertainty but not the vote decision
because I expect it to inuence specically the electorate's information about the
candidates rather than their general information about other aspects of the election.
I also include a set of variables indicating the respondent's vote choice as well
as the timing of her vote decision. These are sets of interaction variables that code
for each candidate whether or not the respondent decided to vote for him before the
convention, during the convention or after the convention. These variables provide a
test of the theory of selective information processing as the theory implies that the
earlier an individual decides to vote for a candidate the less uncertain she is likely
to be for that candidate relative to the other candidates competing for oÆce. This
is due to the fact that after making her decision she continues to gather and process
information only about that candidate for whom she has decided to vote.
Generally, the results of these models provide strong support for the theory that
costs of information determine the electorate's uncertainty about political candidates.
In particular, the coeÆcients on the variables measuring education and family income
are often both negative and statistically signicant, and never both positive and sta-
tistically signicant. However, the results regarding the eect of age are surprising in
that approximately half of the coeÆcients on this variable (scattered across elections)
are positive and statistically signicant. This indicates that while older individuals
have more experience with elections and voting, they may benet only in terms of
the mechanics of voting (for example, where and when to register and vote) and not
in terms of their information about the candidates competing for oÆce.
Somewhat less consistent are the coeÆcients on the variables measuring me-
dia/news attention. In two elections (1984 and 1988) the variable indicating that
the respondent reads a newspaper has a positive and statistically signicant coeÆ-
cient for the Democratic candidate. Although this is much more the exception than
the general trend, it nonetheless runs counter to expectation. Most likely it indicates
that newspapers ran stories transmitting conicting or noisy signals of the candidate's
ideological location.
Not surprisingly, the variables measuring registration requirements generally have
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little or no eect on uncertainty. In six of the eight elections that I analyze the
coeÆcients on these variables are statistically insignicant. In the other two elections
the coeÆcient on the variable indicating DMV registration (for Nixon in 1972 and
Perot in 1992) is negative and signicant. This may bolster the argument (albeit
slightly) for endogeneity between uncertainty and vote choice as it suggests that
individuals facing low registration requirements pay more attention to information
about the candidates and are less uncertain about their ideological locations.
The eects of ideology are extremely consistent: for each candidate in each elec-
tion individuals who categorize themselves as being either liberal or conservative are
signicantly less uncertain than those who categorize themselves as moderate. Hav-
ing relatively extreme ideologies, such individuals are likely to be more interested in
politics and elections than those with middle-of-the-road ideologies. Conversely, the
eects of strength of partisan attachment are much less uniform. Most often the eects
are insignicant, however in a few instances they are the sign and signicance that are
indicative of the inseparable eects of party tactics and strategic information gather-
ing. For example, in the 1984 election strong Democrats and strong Republicans were
signicantly less likely to be uncertain about their own party's candidates. Likewise,
in 1992 strong Republicans were less likely to be uncertain about the Republican
candidate. Unfortunately, whether these trends are caused by strategic information
gathering or party strategy cannot in this analysis be disentangled, as both may lead
to the estimates just described.
It is much easier to identify the cause of the trends in coeÆcients on the vote timing
variables. In the 1980{2000 results many of the coeÆcients are statistically signif-
icant in the direction that supports the theory of selective information processing.
For Anderson and Reagan (1980), Reagan (1984), Dukakis (1988), Clinton (1992),
Perot (1992), Dole (1996), Gore (2000), and Bush (2000) the pattern indicates that
individuals who decide to vote for a candidate early in the campaign are much less
likely to be uncertain about that candidate relative to all others, including individuals
who decide to vote late in the campaign for the same candidate.
As this discussion has attempted to show, taken as a whole, the results of the
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estimation shown in Tables A.1{A.8 provide evidence for a couple of theories. Firstly,
uncertainty is determined by costs of information. The less access one has to reliable
sources of information about the candidates, the more diÆcult it is for one to process
information and the more likely one is to be uncertain. Secondly, uncertainty and
vote choice are very likely to be endogenous. Not only has this analysis shown us it
is probable that voters engage in strategic information gathering, it has also shown
us it is quite probable that voters engage in selective information processing. Thus,
these results both ensure a more accurate estimation of the nal model as well as
indicate important aspects of the electorate's uncertainty.
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Table A.1: Uncertainty about 1972 Presidential Candidates
Binary Logit Estimates
McGovern Nixon
Uncertainty Uncertainty
Constant 0.86* (0.48) 0.59 (0.49)
Weak Democrat -0.25* (0.15) -0.18 (0.16)
Weak Republican 0.03 (0.20) -0.11 (0.21)
Strong Democrat -0.39* (0.21) -0.37* (0.21)
Strong Republican -0.16 (0.23) 0.05 (0.24)
Liberal -3.27** (0.27) -3.67** (0.34)
Conservative -2.65** (0.18) -3.41** (0.26)
HS Degree -0.46** (0.16) -0.38** (0.17)
Some College -1.05** (0.16) -1.02** (0.17)
BA Degree -1.73** (0.28) -1.55** (0.31)
$5-$9K Income -0.06 (0.17) -0.06 (0.18)
$9-$15K Income -0.50** (0.17) -0.48** (0.18)
$15K+ Income -0.76** (0.20) -0.92** (0.21)
Age 0.81** (0.39) 0.75* (0.40)
Vote Decision Timing
McGovern
Before Convention -0.35 (0.23) -0.20 (0.24)
During Convention -0.45 (0.37) -0.47 (0.39)
After Convention -0.39 (0.27) 0.02 (0.27)
Nixon
Before Convention -0.68** (0.17) -0.73** (0.18)
During Convention -0.74** (0.24) -1.01** (0.26)
After Convention -0.61** (0.21) -0.57** (0.22)
DMV Registration -0.45 (0.32) -0.66* (0.34)
Registration Deadline -0.02 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02)
Sqrt Registration Deadline 0.17 (0.18) 0.22 (0.19)
Log-Likelihood -860.9 -789.6
Observations 2025 2025
Entries are maximum likelihood estimates
with associated standard errors in parenthesis.
* indicates a  = :10 level of statistical signicance.
** indicates a  = :05 level of statistical signicance.
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Table A.2: Uncertainty about 1976 Presidential Candidates
Binary Logit Estimates
Carter Ford
Uncertainty Uncertainty
Constant 2.01** (0.39) 2.09** (0.41)
Weak Democrat -0.22 (0.18) -0.15 (0.18)
Weak Republican -0.10 (0.21) 0.00 (0.22)
Strong Democrat -0.33 (0.22) -0.23 (0.23)
Strong Republican 0.01 (0.31) 0.24 (0.34)
Liberal -3.42** (0.32) -3.91** (0.38)
Conservative -2.63** (0.20) -3.19** (0.24)
HS Degree -0.32* (0.17) -0.32* (0.17)
Some College -1.29** (0.22) -1.27** (0.23)
BA Degree -1.76** (0.29) -1.86** (0.32)
$6-$12K Income -0.39** (0.19) -0.26 (0.20)
$12-$20K Income -0.84** (0.20) -0.94** (0.21)
$20K+ Income -1.03** (0.23) -1.13** (0.25)
Age 1.39** (0.45) 1.12* (0.48)
Debate -0.39* (0.21) -0.55** (0.22)
TV Campaign Programs 0.11 (0.25) 0.14 (0.26)
TV News -0.32** (0.15) -0.31* (0.16)
Newspaper -0.59** (0.15) -0.65** (0.16)
Vote Decision Timing
Carter
Before Convention -0.22 (0.23) 0.06 (0.24)
During Convention -0.73** (0.31) -0.73** (0.32)
After Convention -0.08 (0.24) 0.07 (0.25)
Ford
Before Convention -0.32 (0.24) -0.42 (0.26)
During Convention -0.24 (0.29) -0.51 (0.32)
After Convention -0.75** (0.30) -0.67** (0.31)
DMV Registration -0.06 (0.22) -0.19 (0.23)
Registration Deadline 0.02 (0.03) 0.01 (0.03)
Sqrt Registration Deadline -0.14 (0.16) -0.04 (0.17)
Log-Likelihood -704.6 -645.7
Observations 1714 1715
Entries are maximum likelihood estimates
with associated standard errors in parenthesis.
* indicates a  = :10 level of statistical signicance.
** indicates a  = :05 level of statistical signicance.
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Table A.3: Uncertainty about 1980 Presidential Candidates
Binary Logit Estimates
Carter Anderson Reagan
Uncertainty Uncertainty Uncertainty
Constant 1.60** (0.44) 1.99** (0.44) 1.69** (0.44)
Weak Democrat -0.07 (0.18) 0.10 (0.18) -0.11 (0.18)
Weak Republican -0.08 (0.22) 0.14 (0.21) -0.33 (0.23)
Strong Democrat -0.31 (0.23) 0.21 (0.23) -0.32 (0.23)
Strong Republican -0.49* (0.29) -0.43 (0.28) -0.44 (0.30)
Liberal -0.66** (0.18) -0.74** (0.18) -0.70** (0.19)
Conservative -0.67** (0.16) -0.64** (0.16) -0.58** (0.16)
HS Degree -0.56** (0.18) -0.49** (0.19) -0.62** (0.18)
Some College -1.41** (0.22) -1.36** (0.22) -1.45** (0.22)
BA Degree -2.08** (0.28) -2.11** (0.26) -2.23** (0.29)
$10-$20K Income -0.16 (0.19) -0.19 (0.19) -0.30 (0.19)
$20-$30K Income -0.49** (0.23) -0.68** (0.20) -0.54** (0.20)
$30K+ Income -0.61** (0.23) -0.58** (0.22) -0.91** (0.23)
Age -0.09 (0.43) 0.42 (0.43) -0.38 (0.44)
Debate -0.06 (0.16) -0.16 (0.16) -0.06 (0.16)
TV Campaign Programs -0.56** (0.21) -0.64** (0.21) -0.33 (0.21)
TV News -0.02 (0.15) -0.21 (0.15) -0.03 (0.16)
Newspaper -0.38** (0.15) -0.34** (0.15) -0.30** (0.15)
Vote Decision Timing
Carter
Before Convention -0.11 (0.23) 0.07 (0.23) 0.07 (0.23)
During Convention -0.93** (0.41) -1.04** (0.38) -0.75* (0.39)
After Convention -0.01 (0.34) 0.19 (0.34) 0.09 (0.34)
Anderson
Before Convention -0.96 (0.67) -1.06* (0.62) -1.49* (0.79)
During Convention 0.06 (0.89) -0.32 (0.89) 0.04 (0.90)
After Convention 0.16 (0.47) -0.83* (0.50) -0.26 (0.51)
Reagan
Before Convention -0.19 (0.22) -0.16 (0.21) -0.45** (0.23)
During Convention -0.74** (0.31) -0.54* (0.28) -1.08** (0.34)
After Convention -0.39 (0.32) -0.19 (0.31) -0.58* (0.33)
DMV Registration 0.02 (0.21) -0.40 (0.43) -0.05 (0.22)
Registration Deadline -0.02 (0.04) 0.03 (0.04) 0.03 (0.04)
Sqrt Registration Deadline 0.21 (0.22) -0.05 (0.21) -0.06 (0.22)
Log-Likelihood -656.0 -662.3 -638.3
Observations 1197 1196 1196
Entries are maximum likelihood estimates
with associated standard errors in parenthesis.
* indicates a  = :10 level of statistical signicance.
** indicates a  = :05 level of statistical signicance.
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Table A.4: Uncertainty about 1984 Presidential Candidates
Binary Logit Estimates
Mondale Reagan
Uncertainty Uncertainty
Constant -1.12* (0.64) -1.42* (0.76)
Weak Democrat -0.06 (0.29) -0.03 (0.32)
Weak Republican -0.08 (0.31) -0.22 (0.39)
Strong Democrat -0.62* (0.35) 0.02 (0.34)
Strong Republican -0.50 (0.39) -1.41* (0.75)
Liberal -1.13** (0.32) -1.64** (0.38)
Conservative -0.48** (0.23) -0.75** (0.26)
HS Degree -0.17 (0.26) -0.34 (0.28)
Some College -1.09** (0.37) -1.18** (0.40)
BA Degree -1.02** (0.44) -1.92** (0.65)
$10-$22K Income 0.07 (0.26) -0.26 (0.29)
$22-$35K Income -0.77** (0.33) -0.43 (0.34)
$35K+ Income -0.75** (0.36) -0.89** (0.42)
Age 1.92** (0.65) 0.77 (0.71)
Debate -0.14 (0.27) 0.37 (0.32)
TV Campaign Programs -0.62** (0.30) -0.76** (0.34)
TV News -0.11 (0.23) 0.15 (0.25)
Newspaper 0.49** (0.23) -0.36 (0.25)
Vote Decision Timing
Mondale
Before Convention -0.08 (0.34) 0.16 (0.35)
During Convention -0.55 (0.56) -0.27 (0.53)
After Convention -0.27 (0.51) 0.20 (0.46)
Reagan
Before Convention -0.06 (0.30) -0.86** (0.42)
During Convention 0.17 (0.40) 0.02 (0.48)
After Convention 0.03 (0.40) -0.14 (0.45)
DMV Registration -0.34 (0.40) -0.45 (0.45)
Registration Deadline 0.08 (0.05) 0.01 (0.06)
Sqrt Registration Deadline -0.41 (0.31) 0.06 (0.36)
Log-Likelihood -354.5 -283.2
Observations 1509 1508
Entries are maximum likelihood estimates
with associated standard errors in parenthesis.
* indicates a  = :10 level of statistical signicance.
** indicates a  = :05 level of statistical signicance.
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Table A.5: Uncertainty about 1988 Presidential Candidates
Binary Logit Estimates
Dukakis Bush
Uncertainty Uncertainty
Constant 0.98** (0.43) 1.38** (0.44)
Weak Democrat -0.22 (0.19) -0.01 (0.20)
Weak Republican 0.08 (0.21) -0.15 (0.23)
Strong Democrat -0.33 (0.21) -0.04 (0.22)
Strong Republican -0.85** (0.29) -0.83** (0.33)
Liberal -2.13** (0.19) -2.34** (0.20)
Conservative -1.97** (0.16) -1.99** (0.16)
HS Degree -0.31* (0.17) -0.28 (0.18)
Some College -0.90** (0.22) -1.09** (0.24)
BA Degree -1.04** (0.26) -1.37** (0.29)
$12-$25K Income 0.03 (0.16) -0.09 (0.17)
$25-$40K Income -0.40* (0.22) -0.48** (0.24)
$40K+ Income -0.58** (0.23) -0.29 (0.24)
Age 1.03** (0.40) 0.41 (0.43)
TV News -0.55** (0.14) -0.72** (0.15)
Newspaper 0.40** (0.15) -0.18 (0.15)
Vote Decision Timing
Dukakis
Before Convention -0.54* (0.28) -0.32 (0.28)
During Convention -0.80** (0.30) -0.33 (0.29)
After Convention -0.57* (0.34) -0.31 (0.33)
Bush
Before Convention -0.14 (0.28) -0.36 (0.32)
During Convention -0.52* (0.30) -1.30** (0.42)
After Convention 0.01 (0.26) -0.22 (0.29)
DMV Registration 0.12 (0.18) 0.01 (0.19)
Registration Deadline -0.06 (0.03) -0.05 (0.03)
Sqrt Registration Deadline 0.34 (0.21) 0.25 (0.21)
Log-Likelihood -714.8 -650.3
Observations 1771 1771
Entries are maximum likelihood estimates
with associated standard errors in parenthesis.
* indicates a  = :10 level of statistical signicance.
** indicates a  = :05 level of statistical signicance.
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Table A.6: Uncertainty about 1992 Presidential Candidates
Binary Logit Estimates
Clinton Perot Bush
Uncertainty Uncertainty Uncertainty
Constant 1.13** (0.52) 0.95** (0.41) 1.94** (0.53)
Weak Democrat 0.29 (0.23) 0.30* (0.17) 0.18 (0.25)
Weak Republican 0.26 (0.25) 0.12 (0.19) -0.07 (0.29)
Strong Democrat -0.05 (0.27) 0.13 (0.19) 0.19 (0.26)
Strong Republican -0.33 (0.35) -0.31 (0.24) -1.06** (0.49)
Liberal -2.40** (0.23) -1.66** (0.18) -2.66** (0.26)
Conservative -2.20** (0.19) -1.35** (0.16) -1.94** (0.19)
HS Degree -0.02 (0.21) -0.12 (0.17) -0.43** (0.22)
Some College -0.39 (0.26) -0.44** (0.20) -0.65** (0.27)
BA Degree -0.91** (0.35) -0.53** (0.22) -1.56** (0.41)
$13-$30K Income -0.40** (0.20) -0.43** (0.16) -0.63** (0.22)
$30-$50K Income -0.72** (0.25) -0.78** (0.18) -0.77** (0.27)
$50K+ Income -0.91** (0.29) -0.68** (0.20) -0.61** (0.30)
Age 1.52** (0.46) 1.31** (0.35) 0.66 (0.49)
TV Campaign Programs -0.58** (0.22) -0.48** (0.18) -0.77** (0.23)
TV News -0.33* (0.18) -0.22* (0.13) -0.08 (0.19)
Newspaper -0.42** (0.18) -0.12 (0.13) -0.55** (0.19)
Vote Decision Timing
Clinton
Before Convention -0.91** (0.32) -0.17 (0.21) -0.10 (0.30)
During Convention -0.77** (0.37) 0.04 (0.23) 0.09 (0.35)
After Convention -0.61* (0.35) -0.27 (0.24) -0.02 (0.34)
Perot
Before Convention -0.78 (0.66) -1.50** (0.62) -0.93 (0.78)
During Convention 0.30 (1.11)
After Convention -0.21 (0.42) -0.52 (0.33) -0.09 (0.45)
Bush
Before Convention -0.03 (0.29) -0.04 (0.21) -0.49 (0.36)
During Convention 0.40 (0.49) -0.01 (0.39) 0.49 (0.59)
After Convention 0.32 (0.42) -0.23 (0.34) -0.06 (0.53)
DMV Registration -0.25 (0.17) -0.21* (0.12) -0.27 (0.18)
Registration Deadline 0.04 (0.04) 0.04 (0.03) 0.02 (0.04)
Sqrt Registration Deadline -0.30 (0.27) -0.22 (0.20) -0.23 (0.27)
Log-Likelihood -535.1 -893.5 -472.9
Observations 1847 1832 1835
Entries are maximum likelihood estimates
with associated standard errors in parenthesis.
* indicates a  = :10 level of statistical signicance.
** indicates a  = :05 level of statistical signicance.
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Table A.7: Uncertainty about 1996 Presidential Candidates
Ordered Logit Estimates
Clinton Perot Dole
Uncertainty Uncertainty Uncertainty
Weak Democrat 0.48** (0.15) 0.37** (0.16) 0.38** (0.15)
Weak Republican 0.31* (0.17) -0.10 (0.17) -0.18 (0.17)
Strong Democrat -0.06 (0.17) 0.17 (0.18) -0.04 (0.18)
Strong Republican -0.74** (0.22) -0.18 (0.21) -0.67** (0.21)
Liberal -1.00** (0.19) -0.56** (0.20) -1.19** (0.20)
Conservative -0.90** (0.18) -0.59** (0.19) -0.77** (0.19)
HS Degree -0.20 (0.19) -0.29 (0.20) -0.01 (0.19)
Some College -0.35* (0.20) -0.54** (0.21) -0.60** (0.20)
BA Degree -0.19 (0.21) -0.37* (0.22) -0.46** (0.21)
$15-$30K Income -0.06 (0.16) -0.14 (0.17) -0.35** (0.17)
$30-$50K Income -0.04 (0.16) -0.20 (0.17) -0.44** (0.17)
$50K+ Income -0.11 (0.17) -0.30* (0.17) -0.35** (0.17)
Age 0.40 (0.36) 0.24 (0.37) 0.48 (0.36)
Debate -0.30** (0.13) 0.01 (0.13) -0.18 (0.13)
TV Campaign Programs -0.26* (0.14) -0.27* (0.14) -0.35** (0.14)
TV News -0.16 (0.12) -0.04 (0.12) -0.21* (0.12)
Newspaper -0.17 (0.12) -0.16 (0.12) -0.18 (0.12)
Vote Decision Timing
Clinton
Before Convention -0.78** (0.20) 0.03 (0.20) -0.59** (0.20)
During Convention -1.17** (0.28) 0.05 (0.27) -0.71** (0.27)
After Convention -0.43 (0.28) 0.36 (0.29) -0.92** (0.28)
Perot
Before Convention 0.02 (0.42) -0.42 (0.41) -0.10 (0.44)
During Convention 0.20 (0.81) -0.37 (0.76) 0.19 (0.81)
After Convention 0.59 (0.53) -0.13 (0.50) 0.45 (0.55)
Dole
Before Convention 0.37** (0.16) -0.16 (0.17) 0.62** (0.16)
During Convention -0.31 (0.24) 0.21 (0.26) -0.46* (0.25)
After Convention 0.03 (0.21) 0.38 (0.23) 0.34 (0.22)
Registration Deadline 0.01 (0.03) -0.01 (0.03) 0.01 (0.03)
Sqrt Registration Deadline -0.10 (0.16) 0.03 (0.16) -0.08 (0.16)
Cut 1 -2.89 (0.36) -3.00 (0.37) -3.51 (0.37)
Cut 2 -0.58 (0.35) -1.17 (0.36) -1.28 (0.36)
Log-Likelihood -1324.3 -1296.0 -1317.0
Observations 1356 1356 1356
Entries are maximum likelihood estimates
with associated standard errors in parenthesis.
* indicates a  = :10 level of statistical signicance.
** indicates a  = :05 level of statistical signicance.
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Table A.8: Uncertainty about 2000 Presidential Candidates
Ordered Logit Estimates
Gore Bush
Uncertainty Uncertainty
Weak Democrat 0.28* (0.17) 0.32* (0.18)
Weak Republican 0.46** (0.19) 0.25 (0.18)
Strong Democrat -0.22 (0.17) 0.01 (0.17)
Strong Republican -0.39** (0.20) -0.45** (0.20)
Liberal -0.84** (0.18) -1.12** (0.19)
Conservative -1.05** (0.18) -0.98** (0.18)
HS Degree 0.05 (0.22) -0.45* (0.23)
Some College -0.32 (0.22) -0.75** (0.23)
BA Degree -0.51** (0.23) -1.23** (0.24)
$25-$50K Income -0.05 (0.15) 0.03 (0.16)
$50-$75K Income -0.07 (0.17) -0.04 (0.17)
$75K+ Income -0.27 (0.18) -0.05 (0.18)
Age 0.41 (0.36) 0.58 (0.37)
Debate -0.32** (0.13) -0.47** (0.13)
TV Campaign Programs -0.19 (0.17) -0.09 (0.17)
TV News -0.35** (0.12) -0.48** (0.12)
Newspaper -0.16 (0.12) -0.05 (0.12)
Vote Decision Timing
Gore
Before Convention -0.22 (0.17) -0.01 (0.17)
During Convention -0.40 (0.31) -0.18 (0.31)
After Convention -0.39** (0.19) -0.23 (0.20)
Bush
Before Convention -0.81** (0.18) -0.53** (0.18)
During Convention -0.18 (0.30) -0.55* (0.29)
After Convention -0.18 (0.22) -0.62** (0.21)
Registration Deadline 0.02 (0.03) 0.08 (0.15)
Sqrt Registration Deadline -0.08 (0.15) -0.01 (0.03)
Cut 1 -3.07 (0.37) -3.61 (0.38)
Cut 2 -0.86 (0.36) -1.36 (0.37)
Log-Likelihood -1252.3 -1230.4
Observations 1281 1277
Entries are maximum likelihood estimates
with associated standard errors in parenthesis.
* indicates a  = :10 level of statistical signicance.
** indicates a  = :05 level of statistical signicance.
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A.3 Chapter 4, First-Stage Estimates
The models presented in Tables A.9{A.10 are rst-stage estimates that predict uncer-
tainty about the analysis of turnout by income and race. As described in Chapter 5,
these models dier from those in Chapter 4 in that they include interaction terms
that enable them to accurately estimate the eects of changes in uncertainty and
registration requirements on the rate of turnout across various economic and racial
groups. Accordingly, these models are specied identically to those in Tables A.1{A.8
with the exception that they include interactions between the registration deadline
and family income.
As expected, the estimates shown here are quite similar to those shown in Ta-
bles A.1 and A.8. Nearly all of the variables are both the sign and signicance
discussed in the appendix to Chapter 4. The interaction terms are insignicant with
the exception of one on the non-white interaction term for Nixon in the 1972 analysis.
This suggests that non-whites in states with lengthy registration deadlines may be
more likely to be uncertain than others. Given the hypothesized endogeneity between
uncertainty and the vote decision, this result is not surprising as it indicates that those
who are not likely to vote are more uncertain about both Presidential candidates. In
all, the rst-stage results shown here support the theory that uncertainty is caused
by high costs of information and that it is endogenous with vote choice.
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Table A.9: Uncertainty about 1972 Presidential Candidates
Binary Logit Estimates
McGovern Nixon
Uncertainty Uncertainty
Constant 0.66 (0.58) 0.87** (0.38)
Weak Democrat -0.29* (0.16) -0.22 (0.16)
Weak Republican 0.03 (0.20) -0.10 (0.21)
Strong Democrat -0.45** (0.21) -0.42* (0.22)
Strong Republican -0.17 (0.23) 0.05 (0.24)
Liberal -3.30** (0.27) -3.72** (0.34)
Conservative -2.65** (0.19) -3.41** (0.26)
HS Degree -0.45** (0.16) -0.36** (0.17)
Some College -1.05** (0.16) -1.02** (0.17)
BA Degree -1.75** (0.29) -1.57** (0.31)
$5-$9K Income 0.16 (0.53) 0.18 (0.54)
$9-$15K Income -0.18 (0.53) -0.61 (0.55)
$15K+ Income -1.09* (0.68) -1.05 (0.72)
Age 0.90** (0.39) 0.87** (0.41)
Vote Decision Timing
McGovern
Before Convention -0.39 (0.24) -0.24 (0.24)
During Convention -0.52 (0.38) -0.56 (0.40)
After Convention -0.45* (0.27) -0.03 (0.28)
Nixon
Before Convention -0.66** (0.17) -0.72** (0.18)
During Convention -0.64** (0.24) -0.97** (0.26)
After Convention -0.59** (0.21) -0.54** (0.22)
DMV Registration -0.44 (0.31) -0.64* (0.34)
Registration Deadline -0.02 (0.03) -0.03 (0.03)
Sqrt Registration Deadline 0.22 (0.18) 0.25 (0.19)
Registration Deadline
Interactions
(Reg. Dead.)*($5K-$9K) -0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02)
(Reg. Dead.)*($9K-$15K) -0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02)
(Reg. Dead.)*($15K+) 0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02)
(Reg. Dead.)*(nonwhite) 0.01 (0.01) 0.02** (0.01)
Log-Likelihood -858.0 -786.4
Observations 2025 2025
Entries are maximum likelihood estimates
with associated standard errors in parenthesis.
* indicates a  = :10 level of statistical signicance.
** indicates a  = :05 level of statistical signicance.
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Table A.10: Uncertainty about 2000 Presidential Candidates
Ordered Logit Estimates
Gore Bush
Uncertainty Uncertainty
Weak Democrat 0.28 (0.17) 0.32* (0.18)
Weak Republican 0.48** (0.19) 0.23 (0.18)
Strong Democrat -0.23 (0.17) 0.04 (0.17)
Strong Republican -0.41** (0.20) -0.47** (0.20)
Liberal -0.83** (0.18) -1.12** (0.19)
Conservative -1.04** (0.18) -0.98** (0.18)
HS Degree 0.02 (0.22) -0.49** (0.23)
Some College -0.34 (0.22) -0.79** (0.23)
BA Degree -0.53** (0.22) -1.28** (0.24)
$25-$50K Income -0.28 (0.39) -0.60 (0.40)
$50-$75K Income -0.58 (0.42) -0.34 (0.42)
$75K+ Income -0.75* (0.43) -0.45 (0.43)
Age 0.42 (0.37) 0.47 (0.38)
Debate -0.32** (0.13) -0.47** (0.13)
TV Campaign Programs -0.20 (0.17) -0.09 (0.17)
TV News -0.36** (0.12) -0.48** (0.12)
Newspaper -0.15 (0.12) -0.05 (0.12)
Vote Decision Timing
Gore
Before Convention -0.23 (0.17) -0.00 (0.17)
During Convention -0.41 (0.31) -0.18 (0.31)
After Convention -0.39** (0.19) -0.24 (0.20)
Bush
Before Convention -0.79** (0.18) -0.54** (0.18)
During Convention -0.17 (0.30) -0.56* (0.29)
After Convention -0.17 (0.22) -0.64** (0.22)
Registration Deadline 0.01 (0.03) -0.02 (0.03)
Sqrt Registration Deadline -0.10 (0.15) 0.06 (0.15)
Registration Deadline
Interactions
(Reg. Dead.)*($25K-$50K) 0.01 (0.02) 0.03 (0.02)
(Reg. Dead.)*($50K-$75K) 0.02 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02)
(Reg. Dead.)*($75K+) 0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02)
(Reg. Dead.)*(nonwhite) 0.00 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
Cut 1 -3.41 (0.47) -4.11 (0.48)
Cut 2 -1.19 (0.46) -1.85 (0.47)
Log-Likelihood -1250.8 -1227.8
Observations 1281 1277
Entries are maximum likelihood estimates
with associated standard errors in parenthesis.
* indicates a  = :10 level of statistical signicance.
** indicates a  = :05 level of statistical signicance.
